JULY 1970
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The Washington Monthly

THE AEC: WILL WE NUKE OURSELVES?

THE POLLUTION PORKBARREL

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

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VOLUME TWO NUMBER FIVE
JULY 1970

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Letters

Defending Attack Carriers

Thoughtful people are and should be deeply concerned with the difficult problem of maintaining effective, innovative, and economical armed forces. For these people, however, John Wicklein's article on aircraft carriers ["The Navy Prepares for World War II," February, 1970] is bound to be a disappointment. It is largely an unsupported article with deficiencies in describing the future environment, the requirement for surface naval forces, and in comparing the carrier with possible alternatives. A more reasonable and informative argument could have come from a careful use of available information.

I doubt that many serious students of foreign policy would share Mr. Wicklein's confidence in predicting what President Nixon's Guam Doctrine will look like in practice, and what military instruments will and will not be needed to implement that Doctrine. Furthermore, in my view, the author overestimates the technology and capabilities of present and possible future alternatives to the carrier. It is difficult to take seriously the notion that high-speed, 4,000-ton, captured-air-bubble destroyers could have a significant role in the ocean-going Navy of 1975.

It appears that among the source materials used by Mr. Wicklein was a thesis on aircraft carriers which I wrote five years ago at MIT. I wish to emphasize in this connection that several of the judgments attributed to me in the article, or apparently derived from the thesis, do not represent my views. For example, I am quoted as saying, "The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is redundant." This statement is not in my thesis, nor does it reflect my views. The author may have been referring to the chapter on the role of the attack carrier in general nuclear war. That chapter provides a discussion of the uniqueness of the carrier in the Mediterranean in the early Cold War years and contains the statement: "With the subsequent development of land-based air covering NATO's southern flank, and with the later introduction into the region and coverage of the region by sea and land-based missile systems, the Sixth Fleet may have become increasingly redundant."

The situation in the Mediterranean is continually changing. Some of the changes in recent years include stationing there of significant Soviet naval units, the dangerous turmoil in the eastern Mediterranean centering on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the erosion and loss of U.S. land bases. In my opinion, these events have increased, not diminished the importance of the Sixth Fleet. There are circumstances under which the Sixth Fleet probably would be vulnerable. But other U.S. forces that were within any useful reach of the Mediterranean region would also be vulnerable. On balance, I believe the Sixth Fleet adds a significant dimension to U.S. military capability and to the flexibility of U.S. security policy generally in a region which is a present and ominous threat to world peace.

The "private think tank" is referred to incorrectly. The correct identification is the Center for Naval Analyses, not the "Institute for Naval Analyses." Institute of Naval Studies, which is a division of CNA, would also have been correct.

For either the critic or the advocate to make reasonable judgments on the role of the attack carrier and its future, he must come to grips with many complex issues and devise comparisons which are both relevant and

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accurate. In my view, Mr. Wicklein's article failed on both these counts.

DESMOND P. WILSON
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Wilson is with the Center for Naval Analyses.

The author, John Wicklein, replies:

Given the substantiating authorities and the documentation cited in the article, I don't see how an unbiased reader could find it "unsupported." As a matter of fact, two studies that have been made public *since* the article was printed—one by the Systems Analysis Division of the Defense Department, the other by the Brookings Institution—support the central argument: maintaining the attack carrier force wastes millions on a weapon that is not cost-effective for the Seventies.

In assessing Dr. Wilson's letter, it should be kept in mind that the center for which he works holds contracts to make analytical studies for the Navy Department.

The quote "The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is redundant" did not come from Dr. Wilson's thesis, but from a long, personal interview, supplemented by a subsequent telephone interview.

Selling Arms to Egypt

It is not true, as alleged by George Thayer ["American Arms Abroad," January] that in fiscal 1969 "the United States managed to sell $300,000 worth of military equipment to Egypt . . . ." His statement is apparently based on newspaper reports of revelations made by Congressman Coughlin of Pennsylvania last October to the effect that the U.S. Government was secretly selling arms to Egypt.

In fact, we have maintained an embargo on the sale or shipment of military equipment to the United Arab Republic and other Arab states which broke relations with us in June 1967. This embargo covers not only lethal and non-lethal military items and spare parts (such as military trucks) on our Munitions Control List (administered by the Office for Munitions Control, Department of State), but also Department of Commerce-licensed, non-lethal items having significant potential military application (such as two-way radios in quantity). We do authorize sales of Commerce-licensed spare parts for non-lethal items previously supplied by the United States, however.

The figure of $300,000 referred to seems to have been extracted from an all-inclusive listing of exports of apparent military value compiled by the Census Bureau. The exports in this case, which actually totalled $200,395 when final figures were received, were communications equipment and generators with spare parts for civilian consignees, not for the UAR military forces, and they were sold commercially by private firms in the United States, not by the U.S. Government.

The items in question did not have significant military application, and we were satisfied that they would be used for civilian purposes.

I spell out the above because I know how interested you are in disciplined fact-finding.

RICHARD B. PARKER
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Parker is Country Director for United Arab Republic Affairs in the State Department.

George Thayer, the author, replies:

First, the fact that our government has been selling military equipment to Egypt does not come from "newspaper reports," as Mr. Parker states, but from the Defense Department's arms sales office itself. The relevant information is contained in an attachment to a letter from Lt. Gen. Robert H. Warren, the government's chief arms salesman, to Congressman R. Lawrence Coughlin, dated August 13, 1969. The attachment specifically notes that military export sales to Egypt for FY 1969 were $.3 million, or $300,000. Presumably the Defense Department knows what military equipment is.

Second, to say that this military equipment, whatever kind it happens to be, does not have "significant military application" is too silly a remark to warrant much comment. The State Department can't have it both ways: either the equipment is or is not military in type. Obviously someone deemed the material of significant military value and so classified it as such.

Third, Mr. Parker implies that somehow the transaction is less deceptive because the equipment was sold to Egypt by private firms, not by the U.S. Government. Again, the weakness of this argument is clear: presumably, private American military equipment exporters still need government approval before such a sale is made; if not, then our arms export control procedures have deteriorated far more drastically than I had previously thought possible.

Fourth, Congressman Coughlin has never stated that we were *secretly* selling arms to Egypt; he simply stated the fact. Had Mr. Parker read the *Congressional Record* of October 15, 1969, (pages E8502-4) more carefully, he would not have made such a statement.

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ATOMIC
POWER
ABUSE:

The AEC in Colorado

'WELL . . . PERHAPS WE WERE A LITTLE WRONG–

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

-BUT NOT SERIOUSLY WRONG!'

by Anthony Ripley

They were stinging words that Colorado's Lieutenant Governor Mark Hogan aimed at the mighty and once-sacred Atomic Energy Commission. "The AEC has gone too far," Hogan said. "It's back is going to have to be broken." The agency's officials, he charged, "if they are not telling falsehoods, are talking in ways that are meant to deceive."

Such harshness is expected from political mavericks or sandwich-board fanatics. Mark Hogan is neither. He is a blue-eyed, handsome, organization Democrat—a careful, studied, ambitious politican. But Hogan's attack on the AEC is a measure of the rapidly rising doubt felt in Colorado about the benefits of the atom and about the operations of the federal agency whose power and expertise in this arcane field have in the past gone virtually unchallenged, and whose insistent claims about its own safety precautions have been generally accepted. The doubt and concern are intense enough, in fact, so that Hogan, running for governor this fall against popular incumbent Republican John A. Love, has felt secure in making atomic energy an issue in his campaign.

Agitation over the workings of the AEC is not confined to Colorado. Groups in other states across the country have been raising questions and voicing qualms about the agency, which was established in 1946 to bring atomic power under civilian control. Elsewhere, though, the major focus has been on the safety and environmental hazards posed by nuclear-powered generating plants. But the people of Colorado have a greater variety of nuclear worries.

Hogan's attack, for instance, was prompted by the publication of a report,

Anthony Ripley covers the Rocky Mountain States for The New York Times.

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drawn up by non-agency scientists, which revealed that the AEC's Rocky Flats plant, located on a high, windswept rise between Denver and Boulder, had leaked highly toxic plutonium oxide into the surrounding countryside. The fire-prone plant, which makes plutonium triggers for hydrogen bombs, is operated by Dow Chemical Company. Its plutonium oxide leak came on May 11, 1969, during one of the most costly industrial fires in the nation's history. The AEC and Dow at first denied there was any release of radioactivity but later were forced to admit it.

Also troubling people in Colorado are the effects of Project Rulison, an underground nuclear explosion set off last September under the western slope of the Rocky Mountains, near Grand Junction. Rulison was to be the first of several hundred underground shots in the same area aimed at freeing deposits of natural gas by cracking rock deep beneath the surface. The initial explosion cracked things above ground, too. By the beginning of May, over $76,000 had been paid in property damage claims from the tremors of the blast. The gas produced, tainted by radioactivity, will be burned off, releasing some radioactivity to the atmosphere. The exact amount involved and its danger is a matter of controversy.

In Grand Junction itself, the Colorado Department of Health is installing new radiation sampling equipment in private homes, offices, and businesses. Its purpose is to monitor radioactivity given off by the gray, sand-like wastes from uranium milling which builders, until the practice was stopped in 1966, used as fill under concrete slabs and basements. These wastes, called tailings, produce a radioactive gas that seeps through concrete. Radioactivity levels in some houses, with 24-hour-a-day exposure, are well beyond what is permitted for miners on an eight-hour shift in a uranium mine. Other tailings have washed into rivers, bringing radioactive pollution downstream. In all, there are about 15 million tons of such tailings piled around the area of the Colorado River basin.

Another radiation problem, the state's oldest, is the high death rate among uranium miners on the Colorado Plateau. Of 6,000 men who have mined uranium, health officials predict 600 to 1,100 will die of lung cancer by 1985. It is a tragic replay of the lung cancer deaths in Europe among miners who dug radioactive ores for Pierre and Marie Curie.

If the range of nuclear-related problems in Colorado is broader, however, the concern wider spread, and the furor correspondingly more vigorous than elsewhere in the country, the behavior of the AEC in all of this has been different merely in degree, not in kind, from what it has been in other states. The evasiveness, the absence of genuine consultation, the reluctance to accept responsibility, and, above all, the mistakes in judgment demonstrated by the agency may have been exacerbated by the scope of its activities, but with the constantly expanding use of atomic power, there is every indication that what has been happening in Colorado is a portent, not an aberration. The implications for the rest of the country are only too clear.

Some of the protest against the AEC in Colorado grew from the work of the Colorado Committee for Environmental Information, one of a number of non-profit information groups run by scientists across the nation. Dr. H. Peter Metzger, a Boulder biochemist, is president of the Committee. He believes the AEC record in the state has been "tragic." There is no way to argue or explain away, he says, the deaths of the miners, the plutonium leak, the property damage from Rulison, or radiation from the tailings piles. But the agency's officials have tried, and in soft pedalling their problems in the state they opened a substantial credibility gap. "AEC publicity doesn't tell outright lies," says Dr. Metzger. "It tells that part of the truth which is favorable to the AEC and

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ignores the rest. The AEC people simply create an incorrect impression in the mind of the listener and allow it to remain there. Only the technically sophisticated questioner can get the whole truth out of them. Let's face it. Congress has charged the AEC to promote atomic energy. We don't expect other promoters to tell the whole truth. Why should we expect it from the AEC?" And more than the credibility gap is involved. The agency, says Dr. Metzger, operates in secrecy, is self-policing, and controls its own information. "That," he adds, "is a recipe for corruption."

The Dow Rocky Flats plant incident justifies all Dr. Metzger's severity. Dow is proud of its industrial safety record. "There are," it points out, "only three industrial records which surpass the Rocky Flats mark," set seven years ago, of 2,122 consecutive days without a disabling injury. What the pamphlets don't mention is that plutonium is pyrophoric—spontaneously combustible—and that fires have been a constant trouble at the plant. The May 11 blaze created an additional and particularly pesky kind of trouble. "After some 18 years of relative obscurity," states a 1970 Plant Information Summary, "the Rocky Flats plant in 1969 was thrust into headlines across the nation."

The plant had been obscure by design: secret weapons work was being done there, which the management did not much like to talk about, any more than it had talked about the fires—almost all of them plutonium—which had preceded the big one, or more than it would talk about those that were to follow it. The leap to national attention was not immediate, however. There were reports about the May 11 fire in the local newspapers, but not until several months had passed and some interesting Congressional testimony was released did the fire make page one headlines. Then it was revealed that nine days after the blaze Defense Department and AEC weapons experts had gone to Congress for a $45 million emergency appropriation. The fire, they said, had entirely halted United States nuclear warhead production (Rocky Flats is one of eight interlocking plants manufacturing the warheads).

None of the first official utterances on the subject of the fire indicated the true extent of the damage or gave any hint that there had been contamination of the surrounding area. On this latter point there was, in fact, outright denial. Less than a month after the blaze occurred, Lloyd M. Joshel, Dow's general manager at the plant, issued a statement declaring that "there was no radioactive plume of smoke and there was no other type of release of radioactivity to the atmosphere or the environment." As things developed, it was an unfortunate limb to climb out on.

A November report from the AEC investigating team found evidence of "slight exterior contamination" on the roofs of two buildings, although it stated that "there is no evidence that plutonium was carried beyond the plant boundaries." But this, too, it turned out, was less than the truth. On January 13, a team of investigators for the Environmental Information Committee, headed by former West Pointer Dr. Edward A. Martell, sent a report to Glenn T. Seaborg, chairman of the AEC. It was this report which provoked Lieutenant Governor Hogan's outburst: it relayed the discovery of substantial amounts of plutonium in soil samples taken at distances up to four miles from the plant. Dow and the AEC, the Martell group contended, had used insensitive monitoring equipment and thus had missed the plutonium releases, or had failed to follow up on the possibility that danger might exist. For shortly after the Martell report, an AEC paper entitled "Safety Consideration in the Operations of the Rocky Flats Plutonium Plant" conceded that "smoke from the fire was seen at various times to have drifted off at a low angle to the south." The AEC finally admitted that the fire had indeed released some radiation beyond the plant boundaries. But in contrast to the Martell group, which charged that the

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releases were extensive enough to "pose a serious threat to the health and safety of the people of Denver," the agency insisted that the amount was not "significant."

There is general agreement, in which the AEC concurs, that plutonium is terribly dangerous if inhaled—it can, among other things, produce lung cancer. Since its half-life is over 24,000 years, the pollution it brings about is essentially permanent. On the other hand, there is some scientific debate about what constitutes a "safe" level of inhaled plutonium, and the AEC is evidently reluctant to act too hastily. Though the Martell report dwelt on the questionable wisdom of having a major plutonium plant 16 miles from downtown Denver, no such doubts seemed to beset the agency. Rather than moving the fire-prone plant, the AEC was, at the time of the report, busily engaged in repairing it and had started construction on a new $75 million production building.

On May 2, the Rocky Flat plant held its first family day in 19 years, to counteract some of the bad publicity.

Project Rulison was a different sort of episode. On September 10, 1969 a 40-kiloton fission bomb was exploded 8,442 feet below the surface in a draw leading up to Battlement Mesa, about 45 miles east of Grand Junction. It was not a military test but one aimed at freeing underground supplies of natural gas. It was part of the AEC's Plowshare program, which tries to find useful civilian work for atomic bombs. The industrial co-sponsor was the Austral Oil Company of Houston with CER Geonuclear Corporation of Las Vegas hired as manager.

Before the explosion, much of the opposition centered on the danger that any gas produced by the underground shot might be radioactive. The aim of the test was to crack heavy rock formations which contain natural gas but which release it much too slowly for profitable commercial development. In other gas and oil fields the cracking is accomplished with hydraulic pressure or conventional explosives. Critics argued that with a nuclear explosion, the gas produced would chemically combine with a form of radioactive hydrogen, called tritium, and become radioactive itself. Other tritium, in the form of water vapor, is released in small quantities. In addition, a quantity of krypton 85, a non-mixing radioactive gas, would be thrown off.

AEC officials said the radioactivity involved would be extremely small. The underground cavity created by the blast, they said, would trap most of the solid radioactive elements, which would mix with the melted rock and form a glass at the bottom of the cavity. Other critical radioactive elements such as iodine 131 decay quickly, and contamination could be avoided by keeping the well shut for six months. The officials pointed to Project Gasbuggy, a 26-kiloton explosion which had been set off in a gas-bearing rock formation near Farmington, New Mexico: the radioactive releases there, they said, had been well within AEC safety limits. In additon, gas drawn off the Gasbuggy well and flared (burned) gradually appeared to flush out its radioactivity as the flaring continued.

Opponents of Rulison included the American Civil Liberties Union, which led a series of court battles to try to have it barred, and various groups of Colorado conservationists and outdoorsmen. Uproar over the project was particularly fierce in Aspen, the ski resort 55 miles east of ground zero, where the city council voted 4-0 against the shot. A public relations panel of experts was sent in—"a traveling dog and pony show", AEC Test Manager Robert Thalgott called it after weathering about 40 such meetings and speeches in the state. Like all the others, the Aspen meeting was strictly for information; the shot was ready to go and would not be stopped. The men from AEC, Austral Oil, CER Geonuclear, the U.S. Public Health Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey

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concentrated their arguments on their past safety record (at the time, the AEC had more than 450 atomic explosions behind it) and the caution with which the event was being approached. The largely gray-haired, pipe-smoking group tried a friendly, smiling, easy approach, as men of vast experience. "Do me a favor and stop smiling," an Aspen resident told AEC public relations man David Miller, who brought an angry chorus later when he suggested a generation gap was behind the protests. A middle-aged woman said, "You're playing God with generations yet unborn." Thalgott said that if an atom from the explosion fell on anyone in Aspen, they would't know it and it wouldn't hurt them.

Because of the uproar, Rulison promoters were particularly pleased when the test went off successfully. At first, reports showed "minimal" ground motion. A hailstorm broke over ground zero about an hour after the shot, just as the promoters were gathering in the aluminum trailers at the control point, two-and-a-half miles away. Hailstones rattled off the metal roofs with a roar as Thalgott and the others raised plastic foam cups of domestic champagne and shouted congratulations to each other over the din. The celebration was a bit premature.

The AEC had predicted "no significant damage" from ground motion. The area chosen for the blast had been thoroughly researched by geologists: "A literature search for Colorado earthquakes of magnitude greater than 3 was performed by the Environmental Science Services Administration, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey," the Rulison Effects Evaluation Report noted before the explosion, "and of the 300 earthquakes identified, none had epicenters within 50 miles of the Rulison site. This lack of seismic activity further reduces the probability of detectable aftershocks from Rulison."

But predictions did not hold. Geological Engineer David M. Evans of the Colorado School of Mines said the school's Cecil H. Green Seismic Observatory recorded tremors and earthquakes for 17 days following the explosion. Two days after the blast, he reported, a natural earthquake recorded at 3.5 on the Richter scale. During the 17 days, there were two magnitude 4 earthquakes and several in the 3.5 range, along with a number of other smaller tremors, all in a 50-mile radius around the blast site. Clearly, he said, the area was "geologically adjusting" to the explosion.

Anxiety about radioactive contamination faded temporarily from the forefront in the clamor over property damages caused by the blast. In a sense, though, the new complications served to intensify the original uneasiness. Unexpected earth movement was only a minor error in the calculations. But the crumbling chimneys and cracked plaster cast shadows over the safety of the entire project. If the AEC had been wrong on that score, reasoned the critics, what basis was there for trusting their other assurances? And the wrangling involved in the settlement of the claims created bitterness and anger on the part of many independent-minded farmers and ranchers.

The questions about radiation from Rulison are still largely unanswered. In contrast to the case at Rocky Flats, however, there seems to be a possibility that the AEC may have to come to grips with them more satisfactorily before proceeding with business as usual. The decision of Denver's Federal District Court to permit the shot does not apply to the 200-odd additional explosions of which it was slated to be the forerunner, and in the next inevitable round of court tests the opposition's ammunition is bound to be more formidable than before.

No such optimism is warranted in the matter of the uranium tailings, chiefly because it is too late to wipe out the damage already done. But if the AEC cannot be faulted for failing to take appropriate action now, its initial con-

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tribution to the problem provides perhaps the most dramatic example of its lack of foresight and responsibility. The nine uranium mills (out of 17 in the Colorado River Basin) which have left the huge piles of leftovers from the ore-grinding process around the state were established in direct response to the agency's needs. Only two of the mills remain open, but the hazards produced by the early carelessness will if anything become more grave as the years go on.

Uranium is always found with its "daughter" products—the new elements formed as it gives off radiation and decays. Thorium 230 and radium 226 are some of these daughters. Radium, in its turn, decays and gives off radon gas, which decays still further into polonium and radioactive forms of bismuth and lead. All of these elements are found in the tailings. And breathing radon daughters has been acknowledged since the turn of the century as a prime cause of lung cancer, notably among miners.

At the Old West town of Durango, two piles totaling 1.7 million tons sit on rock ledges over the Animas River. They are just across the river from downtown and from the picturesque narrow gauge railroad that hauls tourists up the mountains to the old mining town of Silverton. Before the Foote Mineral Company was forced to grow grass on the pile, the dusty tailings used to blow, when the wind was right, directly over the downtown section. Some tailings also slid from their precipitous location and almost made it into the river. Others were washed down by rains. A Federal Water Pollution Control Agency study in 1966 reported dissolved radium concentrations immediately downstream from the mill were about four times above permissible levels. Twice as much as the permissible level was measured 30 miles downstream, while near-maximum levels were found 60 miles away.

The AEC, noting that it is not charged with the supervision of tailings, has taken only an occasional interest in the problem. It likes to emphasize the brighter side, preferring to quote from another section of the same 1966 water pollution study. The part it uses states: "There is currently no significant immediate hazard associated with uranium milling activities anywhere in the Colorado River Valley." The quotation is taken from a section in the report called "Background." But the preface makes clear that significant immediate hazard was not the subject of the report: "The FWPCA wishes to emphasize that it is not especially concerned regarding immediate hazards from abandoned uranium mill tailings. Rather, the Administration is concerned with the potential problems that appear to be associated with the tailings because of their extremely long-lived radioactivity." It recommends "interim" measures covering the next 10 to 20 years.

But the piles are a long-time proposition. Radium 226 has a half-life of 1,620 years, thorium 230, 80,000 years, and lead 210, 22 years. Plans of an appalling long range will have to be drawn up. At the insistence of Colorado health officials, most of the piles have now been covered, and new pollution to the rivers is within acceptable limits. But as far as radon gas is concerned, covering the piles with grass is roughly comparable to wrapping an onion in gauze.

In Grand Junction the tailings situation is even more complex and troublesome. For 15 years, until the practice was stopped in 1966, builders removed tailings from the American Metal Climax, Inc., uranium-vanadium mill. Now shut down, the mill gave tailings away free, and builders used them for fill under homes, offices, businesses, and public buildings. The tailings, spread eight to 12 inches thick, give off radon gas. The gas itself has a half-life of only 3.8 days, but that is enough time for it to seep through the concrete before producing its radioactive daughters, which remain suspended and can be inhaled. At least 3,000 buildings put up during a 15-year period are believed to have tailings under them. Of 345 identified buildings tested, about 150 have shown advanced readings, according to

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Robert D. Siek, of the Colorado Department of Health.

The highest reading in a Grand Junction building has been 1.8 working levels, 180 times above a recommended level of 0.01. This reading was based on a preliminary, or "grab" sample—a quick technique which is often inaccurate and usually too low. More complex sampling equipment is being installed in a number of buildings to test the full effect of radioactivity. The Colorado Bureau of Mines attempts to keep mine working areas below 1 working level. Between 1 and 2 working levels, fans are required to ventilate the mine shafts. At 2 working levels, the area is cleared of all workmen. This eight-hour occupational exposure five days a week compares to a 24-hour-a-day exposure seven days a week in a private home.

Clearly, if the early "grab" sample readings begin to prove out, there will have to be some evacuation of buildings in Grand Junction. There has been none thus far. The situation is especially critical in school buildings and homes with young children, who are more susceptible to radiation-induced cancers than adults. For the most part, however, symptoms do not show up for 20 or 25 years. There is no "significant immediate hazard," so the city, though a trace worried, mostly ignores the problem for now. And the AEC has done nothing to alert it to the full extent of the danger or to discourage attitudes like that of Barclay Jameson, news director of the Grand Junction *Sentinel*, who complained in a March 8 article that the radon scare story "seems to be whipping up more frenzied excitement the further you get from Grand Junction . . . . ABC came up with a report that left the viewers with the impression that Grand Junction was turning into a ghost town . . . . That last bit drove me into the fit of temper I often end up in when dealing with the provincial jackasses back east . . . ." It was a good-natured article, kidding outside reporters who sat smoking at his desk and asking questions about radon. "I should think that they personally would be a lot more worried about getting zapped by those cigarettes they are smoking than by the sand underneath a concrete slab in a burg out west."

A related area in which the AEC has shown a bizarre and frightening casualness is the mortality rate among miners carving out the ore for its needs. The figures on cancer deaths from radon daughters go back to the turn of the century and the mines in Schneeberg, Austria, and Joachimsthal, Czechoslovakia. At Schneeberg, miners digging pitchblende for early radium experiments, had lung cancer rates 54 times those of the general population. At Joachimsthal, where permissible working levels were about half as high as at Schneeberg, the rate was 29 times that of the general population. Warned by such figures, the U.S. set still more stringent working levels, but they were only loosely applied. In several mines on Navajo Indian lands, for example, natural ventilation alone was used along with wet drilling to keep dust down. Naturally, radon daughter levels were reported alarmingly high. Not surprisingly, 170 miners have already died of lung cancer attributed to radon daughters, according to the U.S. Public Health Service, with an expected 600 to 1,100 more to come.

Here, too, the AEC prefers to look on the bright side. While stressing that it has no legal responsibility in the matter, the agency stated in a recent staff paper (written to rebut criticism by Dr. Metzger) that things seemed to be improving among miners. The paper then listed—incorrectly—figures compiled on cancer deaths. "We believe it is important to note that 12 new cases were reported by Dr. Geno Saccomanno, pathologist, St. Mary's Hospital, Grand Junction, Colorado, in 1967 [the actual number was 16], 11 in 1968 [again it was 16], and 10 in 1969 [this time it was nine]." The same paper took an encouraging view of the results of increased mine ventilation.

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Such enthusiasm, however, was hardly characteristic of a recent report to the Western Interstate Nuclear Board by E.L. Kaufman, radiological health supervisor for the state of New Mexico. Some mines in the state, he said, are moving 300,000 cubic feet of air per minute into a working area, compared with 20,000 cubic feet a few years ago, and the death rate still has not gone down. The massive ventilation has caused bizarre scenes of miners working in 35-mile-an-hour winds in temperatures of 50 degrees below zero with the snow falling underground, he said.

The sensitivity of the radon issue was reflected by the Federal Radiation Council, a group of Presidential Cabinet officers with a technical staff which advises the President and the AEC on radiation safety. In December, 1968—those lame-duck days of an Administration when controversial subjects can be brought up with little political repercussion—the Council sent a memo to President Johnson which said in part: "We do not know at precisely what exposure level uranium miners may be exposed without significantly increasing the risk of lung cancer. But we do know that the mortality rates from the disease in the lower exposure categories are higher than the expected rate." The Department of Labor this year cut permissible exposure from 1 to 0.33 working levels. Such cuts drive up the cost of uranium mining, so delays have been granted while the Arthur D. Little Company studies the impact of the cut on the uranium industry. The $200,000 study is financed by the AEC.

This April, nearly a year after the Rocky Flats fire, an editorial in the *Town and Country Review*, a Boulder County weekly newspaper, stated: "Dow's policy or lack of policy in disseminating information has increased suspicion that they have something to hide . . . . The public is no longer prepared to acccept the 'big brother attitude' on the dangers of plutonium pollution or anything else for that matter . . . . At present the AEC seems to maintain that the public must prove a facility to be dangerous before any action is taken. The reverse should be true . . . ." In the same month, Cal Queal, the environment editor of the Denver *Post*, wrote in his column: "The real story of Rulison has nothing to do with kilotons, cubic feet or microcuries . . . . It's a story of people who are frightened and angry. It's a story of a triumph of modern press agentry. Sadly, it's the story of an outrage committed by the government against its own people."

Candidate Hogan is not yet completely comfortable with the politics of the whole thing. "It's still something of a lost cause at this point," he says. "I wish more people were concerned about it, and I hope it catches up by November." But, he adds, "I'm beginning to get the benefit of being an early prophet."

In any case, Coloradians may soon have some other atomic projects to worry about. The state is getting its own nuclear electric generator, which, having weathered a storm of early objections, is now under construction north of Denver. The Health Department's Robert Siek, who is chief of the radiological health division, has said that the gas-cooled, high-temperature reactor being built for the Public Service Company of Colorado will probably meet stringent new pollution standards. But the department, he says, is still looking with misgivings at a year-old proposal to build an atomic graveyard in the state to bury radioactive wastes. Such graveyards are similar to the tailings piles—they will be around for many generations to come.

Meanwhile, Dr. Martell, who worked on the plutonium study at Rocky Flats, tells visitors occasionally that he wonders if man was ever meant to dabble in the transuranium elements—those man-made elements like plutonium beyond uranium on the periodic chart. And other concerned people display bumper stickers reading:

COLORADO, PLAYGROUND OF THE AEC ■

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ATOMIC POWER ABUSE:

The Marginal Nuclear Utilities

by Richard Karp

The Atomic Energy Commission is headed for increasing trouble on two fronts: environmental and economic. Over the past few years, the environmentalists' sallies against the agency have been slowly gaining ground, despite the AEC'S contention that concern over thermal pollution is unnecessarily morbid ("thermal enrichment" is the agency term for waterways overheated by radioactive wastes), that fear of reactor explosions ("incidents") is unfounded, and that apprehension over the effects of radioactive smoke is somehow a mark of hypochondria (there is no evidence, the AEC says, that the smoke is harmful).

Now the AEC's balance sheets are beginning to look as bad as its radioactive emissions. The agency's efforts to develop nuclear-powered electricity have failed; utility companies, burned more than once by AEC nuclear reactors, are going back to conventional sources of electricity. But the agency—true to its mission as promoter of things radioactive—has responded by asking Congress for funds to launch another kind of reactor, the "fast breeder," that is technologically dubious and economically unsound—and extremely hazardous besides. The fast-breeder will not provide cheaper electricity; it will, however, contain the potential for accidental nuclear explosions that would dwarf any of the incidents that have taken place so far.

Such is the sorry state of the dream, born in 1945, that atomic power could somehow be harnessed to provide us with virtually infinite amounts of electrical power. In 1946, Congress created the Atomic Energy Commission with unique authority to regulate, promote and operate atomic power—a virtual government monopoly over a potential industry. In the following few years the AEC devoted itself to one task—building atomic bombs for the Department of Defense. With the Cold War providing lots of business for the bomb-makers, the early enthusiasm for a civilian nu-

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clear industry had all but disappeared.

By the early 1950's, however, the AEC realized that if it continued to make bombs only, it might eventually have to go out of business. The problem was expressed by one AEC Commissioner of the time, who queried, "How much can you improve a toothbrush?" The opportunity to go commercial came in 1953, when Eisenhower appointed Lewis Strauss chairman of the AEC. Strauss had been a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co., a Wall Street firm with heavy investments in utilities. He wanted to get utilities interested in nuclear power, and to do so he used a carrot and stick technique. Under a device called the "Access Permit Program," the AEC gave classified information to consortia of manufacturers, utilities, and scientists, in the hope that they would see industrial potential in the information. At the same time, an Industry Advisory Committee began to entice industry with promises of financial aid. The stick part of the strategem was a slightly veiled threat that if industry didn't invest in nuclear power, the AEC would use its unique powers to promote a government-owned atomic-powered utility business.

When, in December, 1953, President Eisenhower gave his famous "Atoms for Peace" speech before the United Nations, the AEC was ready to move ahead quickly with its civilian reactor program. But, in order to proceed, the AEC needed Congressional permission to allow private enterprise to build and own nuclear facilities. That permission came in the form of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which gave the AEC authority to grant licenses to manufacturers and utilities to build and operate nuclear reactors. The 1954 act expressly forbade the government to sell or distribute electricity for commercial use. If nuclear energy began to look good to the utilities, the law made it possible for them to get government money. If they didn't want nuclear industry, they did not have to fear government competition. In effect, private industry would to a great extent control the process of nuclear development. And for the next couple of years they sat on it.

Promoting Atomic Lemons

By 1957 it was apparent to the AEC that utility companies were not interested in nuclear power. Part of the reason for their lack of interest was that no utility could get more than $60 million insurance for an atomic plant. The "Brookhaven Report" had estimated that damages resulting from an accident in a reactor could total $7 billion. In order to remove this obstacle to nuclear development, Congress passed what came to be known as the Price-Anderson Act. The act guaranteed to utility companies an additional $500 million of federal insurance. More importantly, the act limited liability for nuclear accident claims to $560 million and thus removed entirely that element of risk to the industry.

Though the road was now cleared of obstacles, it was still necessary to get profit-minded industry to invest in the dubious nuclear field. So the AEC began in the late Fifties its "Power Demonstration Program," a device for giving equipment manufacturers huge sums of money for "research and development" and enticing them to invest their own money in the hope of future monopolies in a lucrative market. To spark active interest on the part of the utilities, the AEC rushed to completion in 1958 the first commercial nuclear power station, at Shippingport, Pa. It turned out to be an economic failure, producing far too little electricity at a far from competitive price. The AEC has kept this model reactor in operation by pouring about $120 million in subsidies on top of the original investment.

Looking at the Shippingport lemon, the utilities again lost interest in nuclear power. But by that time, the early Sixties, nuclear power had become a vested interest. Manufacturers, who had been getting subsidies through the "Power

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Demonstration Program" had by now waxed enthusiastic and were investing significant amounts of their own funds. Companies like Westinghouse, General Electric, Babcock-Wilcox, and corsortia such as Atomic International had sunk millions into reactor development. They could recover their portion of nuclear investments only by selling or leasing reactors to utility companies.

The nuclear contractors decided to take part in another AEC effort to get utilities interested in "going nuclear." The first step was taken in 1962 when the AEC issued a carefully worded report admitting that the reactors that had been built were economic duds. The trouble was that the reactors were too small to be economic; what is needed is a reactor 3 or 4 times the current size, said the AEC. "Scaling-up" would do the trick. Manufacturers began high-pressuring utility companies to buy large reactors. To break the ice with the utilities and to win public acceptance of reactors as "good neighbors," the Consolidated Edison Company of New York City was persuaded to ask the AEC for a license to build a large reactor in Ravenswood, Queens, a section of New York about a mile from Times Square. The idea of a nuclear reactor going up in the middle of New York City raised such a public furor that the plans were aborted in 1963.

A safer strategy was taken by General Electric when in 1962 it offered New Jersey utilities a reactor so large that it would "overcome the unit cost" problem. It would be built at Oyster Creek, a desolate part of the New Jersey shore and be 2½ times as big as the biggest existing reactor. GE would do all the work of building and then for $68 million would turn over the key to Jersey Central Power and Light. Oyster Creek was hailed as the biggest breakthrough in nuclear development. While Oyster Creek was going up, manufacturers were out selling their reactors to utilities at less than cost, hoping to recoup their initial losses later when the whole country was expected to "go nuclear." The result was that, by 1965, nuclear industry experienced its first—and last—boom. The utility companies had begun to flood the AEC with requests for licenses.

The boom did not last long, and by 1968 it was over. As reports came in of successive breakdowns, unexpected costs and poor performance, nervous manufacturers began raising their prices to recoup their losses and even more nervous utilities began cancelling their orders. When environmentalists began to disclose 20 years of mismanagement and insufficient safety standards, the utilities grew even warier of nuclear investments. And when the Oyster Creek plant turned out to be an economic fiasco, they started a full retreat. The Oyster Creek experience was fairly typical of the utilities' repeated disappointment with the promise of nuclear power. Even with the federal subsidy to bring down the cost of the equipment, the utilities could not make a go of it because operating costs were too high—at Oyster Creek the costs ran double what had been predicted. One major factor in the high operating cost is that none of the reactors has been able to run at its promised capacity; some, after a decade, are running at less than half capacity.

Ironically, as the utilities were again deciding that nuclear power plants spell economic disaster, Senators George Aiken and Clinton Anderson set out to remove the nuclear business's government cushions. Last year they introduced a bill to "put the atomic power industry under the anti-trust laws just like other business enterprises." Aiken contends that it is high time the AEC acted under a 1954 provision requiring it to inform the President if it finds nuclear reactors to be of "practical value." Although the AEC has promoted nuclear reactors as a commercially competitive power source, it has never issued a commercial license, the procedure that follows a finding of "practical value." Instead, the 16 operating reactors, the 48 under construction, and others which are only in the

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planning stage have each been issued a license under a medical therapy and research provision in the law. If the bill were to become law, the AEC and the nuclear industry would be faced with an embarrassing dilemma, since the 1954 Act expressly forbids the AEC to help finance reactors licensed under the "practical value" clause. By granting research licenses exclusively and by negotiating cost-plus contracts with a half-dozen of America's largest manufacturers, the AEC has paid for 60 to 70 per cent of the cost of reactor development. Oddly enough, despite the fact that all this has been done in the name of research, the Securities and Exchange Commission has authorized the utilities buying those reactors to issue stock on the basis that they are economically feasible.

The utilities moved quickly to disabuse Congress (and the stock market) of the notion that nuclear power could be profitable, and in so doing they contradicted 20 years of AEC optimism. At the November, 1969, hearings on the Aiken bill, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy listened to Philip Sporn, retired president of the American Electric Power Company and an old-time advisor to the Joint Committee. Sporn said:

> During the past two years there has taken place a remarkable and ominous retrogression in the economics of our nuclear power technology. The light-water moderated reactor [conventional kind], which two years ago offered potentials for nuclear power generation competitive with fossil fuel . . . has today lost position . . . .

Regarding the failure of the Oyster Creek plant, Sporn contended that, if allowed to operate until 1980, the reactor would "constitute a burden on the national economy of $3.5 billion." So inefficient have reactors proven to be that "if something serious happened to the continuing supply . . .of coal and nuclear energy were called upon to pick up the burden . . . the nuclear industry

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would simply fall flat on its face." But, added Sporn, a drop in the supply of fossil fuel is not likely in the near future. Sporn concluded that the whole nuclear business "should be subject to soul-searching inquiry."

Indeed, "soul-searching" of a kind is just what the nuclear industry has been doing in the last couple of years. After an initial rush of orders for atomic reactors by utility companies that began in the mid-1960's and peaked in 1967, business has gone steadily downhill. As against a peak of 25,780 megawatts of nuclear power placed on order in 1967, orders declined in 1968 to 16,044 megawatts, and in 1969 to 7,190 megawatts. Moreover, in the last two years many utilities have decided to complete fossil-fuel power plants ahead of scheduled atomic units, and in some cases utilities have scrapped their plans to go nuclear altogether and are planning to resume building coal plants.

A number of reactor manufacturers have decided to pull out of the nuclear industry and cut their losses. One such case seems to point directly to the core of the trouble in the nuclear industry. Allis-Chalmers Company of Milwaukee recently announced that it was "phasing out" its AEC-backed nuclear reactor program after 20 years. The net result of the company's 20 years of research and development was the LaCrosse Reactor, which it recently sold to a power cooperative in Wisconsin. Carl Clamp, senior vice president of Allis-Chalmers, when asked in an interview if after 20 years Allis-Chalmers had developed a reactor that was economical, replied, "I don't know. You would have to ask the operating utility." How much federal money did Allis-Chalmers get in its 20 years of work for the AEC? "We don't give out that kind of information," said Clamp. The AEC takes a very dim view of Allis-Chalmers's recent decision. A.N. Tardiff, director of the AEC's Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program, says, "Allis-Chalmers went out of [the nuclear power] business because they were doing lousy work."

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The Aiken-Anderson bill is not the only current attack on the status quo at AEC. A number of other Senators have introduced measures calling for broad investigation of the civilian nuclear power program, and, under pressure from Senator Edmund S. Muskie, the Federal Radiation Council has agreed to review its radiation standards for the first time in a decade. Late last year, the state of Minnesota took the AEC and a local utility to court. The state had set radiation emission standards on a nearly-completed reactor that were just two per cent of the level permitted by the AEC. When the AEC insisted that it alone could set radiation standards, 15 other states joined Minnesota in the suit, which, since it raises the issue of states' rights, seems likely to go eventually to the Supreme Court. Most recently, the Administration proposal for the creation of a new federal environmental protection agency, with authority over radioactive pollution, would deprive the AEC of its present power to regulate the nuclear operations which it also promotes.

Science to the Rescue

The dim prospects for conventional nuclear reactors place the AEC in a situation comparable to the mid-1950's, when the agency feared extinction. Unlike bomb production—the successful "toothbrush" of the last decade—conventional reactors face abandonment because of failure. Such abandonment would, of course, be unpalatable to the AEC; and therefore the search for a replacement has already begun. The AEC, remembering the source of its original business, looks to the scientists for salvation. And theoretical physics has provided what to the AEC is a new frontier of bureaucratic survival.

A quarter-century ago physicists discovered a function of nuclear fission which, if perfected, could have an impact on mankind as profoundly beneficial as the atomic bomb was destructive. What they had discovered was the technical possibility of "perpetual motion," embodied in the concept of the "fast breeding" nuclear reactor. The conventional reactors which have been developed and built over the years are able to use only 0.7 per cent of the uranium ore as fuel. That is, only that tiny fraction (U235) of uranium ore (mainly U238) which is naturally radioactive is utilized in reactors. On the other hand, a reactor using the "breeding" process could transform the bulk of uranium ore (U238) into the fissionable fuel plutonium 239. If such a reactor could produce or "breed" plutonium 239 at a rate greater than it uses up U235, it will have produced more fuel than it has used. According to a recent study by the RAND Corporation, "This [process] in effect increases the world's fuel reserves by almost a factor of 100."

It was just such a possibility that emboldened the early physicists to boast that they had found the "key to the universe." A more earthbound enthusiast of the early days simply promised the world that in the future "there would be no more need for electric meters." In actuality, very little has been done in the last 20 years to promote the development of the breeder reactor. The AEC, busy promoting conventional "light water" reactors, has done little to promote research into breeder technology. Of the $2.3 billion that the AEC has funneled into its Civilian Reactor Development Program, only about $1 billion has gone into breeder research. Breeder development has, in the words of one AEC spokesman, "been very low-keyed."

And there are good reasons. One is that breeder reactors require a technology very much more difficult than that of the conventional reactors, one which nuclear physicists have never been able to master. An AEC spokesman concedes, "We are still unfamiliar with breeder technology." Another reason, closely connected with the technological problem, is that breeder reactors are potentially, and inherently, very hazardous. A breeder reactor, if it could ever be made to work, would produce and util-

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ize enormous quantities of plutonium 239. Plutonium is the stuff they make atomic bombs with—it is a man-made element, extremely active, and deadly toxic. The chain reaction of a bomb would actually take place in a breeder. A reactor-shattering explosion would release into the air enough plutonium to kill hundreds of thousands of people in the vicinity of the electric plant. Another fact that makes such a catastrophe all the more possible is that breeders use liquid sodium instead of water to transfer heat from the reactor core to the steam turbines. Liquid sodium is so volatile that it explodes upon contact with water.

The recognized hazards of breeders are such that Lewis Strauss, when he was chairman of the AEC, warned enthusiasts that breeders were "the most dangerous of reactors." This note of caution coming from one of the most tireless (to many, notorious) promoters of nuclear energy is matched by another statement made 10 years later by an even more ardent devotee of atomic power. In 1965, Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb, speaking about reactors in general, told an audience of potential investors in nuclear energy:

> In principle, nuclear reactors are dangerous. A gently seeping nuclear reactor can put its radioactive poison onto a few hundred square miles in a truly deadly fashion. In my mind, nuclear reactors do not belong on the surface of the earth. Nuclear reactors belong underground.

The few experiments conducted in the field of breeder reactors have not been very successful. Of the four tiny reactors that the AEC built to experiment with different aspects of the breeding process, one, known as the Experimental Breeder Reactor No. 1, went haywire and exploded. Luckily for the people in the surrounding Idaho towns, the explosion did not breach the reactor's outer containment walls. An AEC manual on the Breeder Reactor Program refers to this accident in a section called "Specific Highlights of the U.S. Fast Breeder Reactor Program": "A partial core meltdown in EBR 1 during a transient experiment in 1956, with no serious effects outside the plant."

What Almost Happened

Far more frightening is what almost happened at the Enrico Fermi Fast Breeder Reactor. The Fermi reactor was the first, last, and only attempt to build a large-scale commercial breeder reactor for a power station. The Fermi reactor was the brainchild of a man named Walker Cisler, chief engineer of the Detroit Edison Company, and friend of Lewis Strauss. In 1956, Cisler organized the "non-profit" Power Reactor Development Corporation (PRDC), an association of 21 companies led by Detroit Edison. The PRDC asked the AEC for a license to construct and operate a 200 megawatt breeder reactor about 30 miles outside Detroit. The AEC's blue-ribbon Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, composed of leading atomic scientists, advised against building the reactor. Strauss suppressed the report. When it leaked out, Senator Anderson, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, accused the AEC of "star chamber" proceedings, and another committee member, Congressman Chet Holifield, accused Strauss of "recklessness." Detroit's United Auto Workers union took a suit against the building of the reactor to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the Fermi reactor.

Ignoring the turmoil, the AEC issued the PRDC a construction permit on August 4, 1956, with the promise that the government would buy all the plutonium 239 it produced at the inflated price of $40 a gram. Unlike the conventional light-water reactors, which were financed primarily by the AEC, the Fermi breeder would be built by the PRDC solely. As a result, the Michigan Public Service Commission allowed the PRDC to charge off its expenditures as a research and development undertaking.

Originally estimated at about $40

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million, the Fermi plant cost $124 million to build. In August, 1966, during a 60-hour test run, the first electric power generated by nuclear energy from Fermi flowed through the Detroit Edison lines. After a shutdown for some minor repairs, another test run began on October 4. At 3:09 p.m. on October 5, high-radiation alarms sounded in the building housing the reactor. The chain reaction had gone out of control and the reactor had to be "scrammed," or shut down by emergency methods. The Fermi reactor has been shut down ever since.

Had Fermi's engineers not been able to "scram" the reactor in time, an explosion might have occurred, with catastrophic consequences. A study of the safety of the Fermi reactor, commissioned by the PRDC and conducted by the University of Michigan, estimated that 133,000 persons would be killed in an explosion like the one which almost occurred. The AEC discounts such an accident as being only "remotely possible."

What Will Fermi Breed?

What the AEC does not discount is the fact that this $120 million machine has produced $303,000 worth of electricity, and, in the words of a critic, "nary a gram of plutonium." Yet, despite Fermi's signal failure, the PRDC, minus 19 of its 21 members who have pulled out of the enterprise, is rushing to start the reactor up by this summer. There is little doubt that behind the rush is pressure from the Atomic Energy Commission, and with good reason.

Now before Congress is the AEC's FY 1971 appropriations bill, and it contains about $250 million for development of the breeder reactor, the first installment of a 20-year, $3 billion "Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program." After 20 years of neglect, the AEC has suddenly decided to make "breeder development" its priority goal, and at a cost equal to all previous civilian reactor development expenditures. Actually, according to critics of the AEC, the breeder program might cost more like $5 billion when it's over. Moreover, the breeder, providing it can ever be built, would have a cost-benefit ratio of between minus-10 and plus-10 per cent. That is, the most that can be hoped for is a 10 per cent return on the investment in the breeder.

The AEC hope for the investment in the breeder is a modest 7 per cent—quite a comedown from those days in which breeder power was going to eliminate the electric meter. And even that figure is a wishful one. The AEC assumes that it can develop the breeder technology. But the technology is not ready yet, and no one knows what operating problems it will entail. Applying the agency's own track record to its present forecasts would lead one to expect higher costs and much less electricity. The breeder is dubious on other grounds. For one thing, a 7 per cent return, in the unlikely event it materialized, is hardly enough to justify investment of tax money—compared to the private industry yardstick of 12 to 20 per cent. More important, fuel costs are shifting against the nuclear reactor. Uranium is getting more expensive, while the price of coal has been dropping; should the Administration decide to drop the quotas on oil imports, oil-fueled electric plants would be cheaper than nuclear ones.

What the AEC is proposing, then, is investment in a losing proposition that, as its chief side effect, will dot the nation with plants like Enrico Fermi at Detroit—each one of which will lessen the odds against a massive nuclear accident.

Against that impressive list of liabilities, what reason remains to build the fast breeder? Only that, after the failure of the conventional reactor, the fast breeder is the AEC's only hope for continuing its reactor operations. For 25 years, the agency, veiled in secrecy, protected by its Congressional committee, has been assuring the American people that nuclear power is both safe and inexpensive. And now those assurances are coming home to roost. ■

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The Political Puzzle

by John Barclay



Across

1. From exterior to interior. (6, 1, 6)
8. Victim of cerebral ablution. (6, 1, 6)
11. Inventor comes back impartial. (6)
14. Rye set for earlier day or year. (6)
17. Adjust to knit her sweater. (7)
19. Times and Herald are not with it today. (7)
20. Animals to let rust. (7)
21. Used 28 down. (7)
22. Adjust gears in extreme shape. (6)
25. Why no ears. (6)
28. He introduced Martha to Washington. (4, 1, 8)
30. Roger Williams is confused Chief of State. (7, 6)

Down

1. Top level cover-up. (3)
2. Put spool back and it comes undone. (5)
3. Baylor in Illinois? (5)
4. Nixon feature. (4)
5. Roy VI floats again. (5)
6. Tut and Zog, for example. (5)
7. Aly is no priest. (3)
9. 1, 8, or 30 across, for example. (9)
10. Hard to see, especially for 1 across. (9)
12. There is merit in a pause. (7)
13. Birds from the North. (7)
15. High level rite due. (7)
16. Shorten 6 down where they sit. (7)
18. Members of select military group. (3)
19. Regulatory body appears for short time. (3)
23. Take the el from Hickory Hill. (5)
24. Capital idea found in Omaha noise. (5)
25. The right side of the director. (5)
26. Ocular quid pro quo. (2, 3)
27. Place to work hard? (4)
28. Goes after a moose in Saskatchewan. (3)
29. Something lost at Vegas. (3)

The numbers indicate the number of letters and words, e.g., (2,3) means a two-letter word followed by a three-letter word. Groups of letters, e.g., USA, are treated as one word. Answers to this month's puzzle will appear in the August issue. Answers to the June puzzle are on page 80.

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(continued from page 5)

It is clear that Mr. Parker's letter is prompted less by any concern for factual error than by a need to justify such a sale of military equipment to his State Department superiors. Obviously our government must continue to claim that it still maintains a military equipment embargo against Egypt, when in fact our true policy is to maintain it except when it interferes with business. Mr. Parker is just a victim of this pious deception.

Farm Programs: Another View

The article by David Francis ("The Remembered Americans: Down on the Farm") in the April issue is shot through with inaccuracies and contradictions. It is little wonder that the "conclusions" reached are largely irrelevant.

The basic flaw in the article, I think, is that it fails to examine the farm program in the context of its purpose, which is to serve the needs of agriculture as a business. The article seems to regard a farm as a fenced area to hold people who are on welfare. If that were the case, then perhaps the equitable distribution of money would be the only problem. But farming is a business. If it is not treated as a business, then indeed the farm program makes little sense.

The farm program seeks to deal with two basic problems of agriculture as a business: 1) the farmer is unable to plan his production to fit the needs of the market; and 2) in a market place where he has virtually no power, the farmer must have price protection. Although the farm program has not dealt effectively with either of these problems, at least it is relevant. It needs to be strengthened, not destroyed.

I do not believe one can ever separate reality from myth in the farm program if one regards all payments as merely "subsidies" in the welfare sense. Subsidies have a purpose that transcends income supplementation. Their main purpose is to make it possible for a farmer to plant less then his entire acreage in a particular commodity. He has the capacity to produce more than can be sold. Yet he has bought, or inherited, the land. He pays taxes on all of it. Contrary to popular belief, idle land, like most idle machines, requires upkeep which costs money.

It is little wonder that the article blithely favors a low limitation of subsidy payments. I happen to agree that a limitation of payments is now desirable. The fuel to the fire under the subsidy controversy is added to, however, by inflammatory inaccuracy. The article says, "as it is now, the bulk of farm subsidies go to the relatively well-to-do or rich farmer because the farm program is commodity-oriented." Yet figures given by Congressman Paul Findley of Illinois later in the article seem to disprove this assertion. Only 5,885 farms got payments over $25,000 in 1968, says Findley. This is a fractional percentage of total farms, of course. But Mr. Francis wasn't talking about numbers of farms, evidently, but about numbers of dollars. Why then didn't he give the dollar figure? It is readily available and it is $276,103,085. This is slightly over eight per cent of the total of $3.2 billion. As a matter of fact, Mr. Francis later seems to contradict himself by noting a study by Walter W. Wilcox that even a $5,000 limit per program would have cut 1968 "farm subsidies by $400 million"—still only a little over 10 per cent of total payments.

It is rather easy to jump to the conclusion that all of this has "created hardship for American consumers," as Mr. Francis says. However, I do not know why he did not refer to a frequently quoted figure—that the American consumer spends relatively less of his spendable income for food than any other consumer in the world—16½ cents of each dollar. He could not have been unaware of it. He did point out that "the average city family paid $1,173 at retail for its farm-originated foods." He must know that the average city family had an income nearly six times this amount. Although he suggests that the farmer is the villain, he quite accurately contradicts this by pointing out that of the $1,173 spent for food, only $447 found its way back to the farmer. "Middlemen took the rest," he notes.

He concludes that the poor are victimized by the "high cost" of food. I suggest that it is closer to the truth to argue that the poor are victimized by a corporate-political system that exploits them on and off the job. It is the same system that victimizes the farmer, I believe.

One of the most absurd arguments advanced by Mr. Francis is against "commodity-oriented" programs. The program must be commodity-oriented because farming itself is commodity-oriented. Simply retiring land—while it might limit the total tonnage of commodities produced—would have little to do with limiting the production of specific commodities. This is the basic flaw in the massive land retirement proposal of the Farm Bureau and Nixon Administration. It won't work. Fifty, or a hundred, million acres of cropland could be retired, yet farmers might decide to plant all, or most, of their remaining land in some one commodity in response to what appeared to be a favorable price outlook. The result would be

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serious overproduction of that commodity, and shortages in others.

Mal-distribution of income is not the result of the farm program. It is part of a pattern. Ownership of capital assets is becoming concentrated in the hands of the few, not only in farming, but in the rest of the economy. Income patterns follow ownership patterns. Farm payments—most of which still go to small farmers—have delayed the corporate takeover of agriculture. They have not delayed it enough, to be sure. But that is because they have not worked well enough to achieve production management and price protection. It is easy to say when something happens in spite of efforts to prevent it, that it happens because of the efforts. But this seldom stands up in the cold light of the facts.

VICTOR K. RAY
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Ray is Director of Public Affairs for the National Farmers Union.

The author, David Francis, replies:

Mr. Ray says that farming is a business. I agree. The biggest and better farms do rather well financially in this business. The point of my article, however, was that farmers are being treated as if they were on welfare, except that most of the welfare money goes to those farmers who need it least.

I stand by my assertion that the bulk of farm subsidies go to the relatively well-to-do or rich farmer. As statistical proof, it might be noted that in 1969, 5.7 per cent of all farmers received more that $5,000 in federal payments or 42.8 per cent of all government payments for the cotton, wheat, feed grain, sugar, and wool programs. Some 11.6 per cent of farmers got 57.4 per cent of total payments in these programs. This fact weakens Mr. Ray's claim that farm payments have delayed the corporate takeover of farming. In some cases, indeed, it may have encouraged corporations to create large farms that can most benefit from the commodity-oriented program. Proof on either side of this argument, admittedly, is limited.

On Funding the People

Commenting on the article, "Funding the People" by Malcolm E. Peabody, Jr. [May], regardless of the potential merit of the proposed program of the Administration to deal with the problems of poverty, comparison of it with the GI Bill of Rights is most inappropriate.

1. Merely to hand funds to the poor with no strings attached makes the program sound like the "52-20 Club" (unemployment insurance), a portion of the GI Bill which is best forgotten.

2. The benefits of the GI Bill (Servicemen's Readjustment Act) were open to all veterans, regardless of personal or family means.

3. It follows that had veterans been required to attend specially constituted colleges, and later to live in specially constructed housing, probably half of them would not have participated in the programs.

4. The slur that many veterans were "no brighter or more ambitious than the next man" is very poorly taken. Veterans had to compete both with other veterans and with non-veterans for college admission and ultimate graduation.

Mr. Peabody's assertion that "recipients with bargaining money in their hands would stand in a much different relationship [to] the staffs of the institutions that serve their needs" is quite incorrect. Neither the middle classes nor even the wealthy have any real "bargaining power" vis-à-vis any institutions. While increased means admittedly brings added freedom of choice, no individuals (except in their capacity as leaders in government or industry) have any real "economic power."

The writer of the article, while justly critical of the "War on Poverty," does not seem to realize that this program was in fact primarily a source of political patronage, just as "Appalachia" was basically a highway building program disguised as regional development.

HUGH L. LUIGGI
Las Vegas, Nevada

The author, Malcolm E. Peabody, Jr., replies:

Mr. Luiggi has raised a point with which I agree. Handouts without strings are not effective where the goal is individual improvement, for example, to improve a person's education or job skills. Where the goal is merely to support a family without improvement, such as programs that provide basic living expenses, no-string payments are preferable to the many-stringed welfare programs. However, the funding-the-people approach envisions the restricting of funds so that they are used only for the purpose intended. A job training program, for example, which was funded directly in the manner described in the article, would allow a voucher credit to those eligible which could only be spent on the tuition for certified job training courses. The voucher would not be paid in cash, only for tuition, so the program would not become another "52-20" club.

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Answering Mr. Luiggi's point on bargaining power, it is true that a single person working alone would have difficulty effecting a change in attitude of any program official, but such officials could ill afford to ignore the needs and desires of many of their clients if such clients had a choice of where to go.

Public Service Strikes

Professor Galbraith's characteristically charming and potentially influential article on "What Happened to the Class Struggle?" [February] deserves close and critical examination. The most crucial point which such an examination turns up is this: There is an essential yet quite unnoted contradiction between Galbraith's objective of achieving public control of wage bargains for the sake of the general interest in price stability and his "liberal" strictures against those who would hold on to the last restraints against the use of the most important monopolistic weapon, the strike, in the public service.

If one seriously worries about the distortions and inequities generated by unrestrained "collective bargaining" backed by the strike threat, then one should certainly hesitate to enshrine this system where it does not yet hold firm sway and where it is capable of doing the greatest harm. This latter point follows, despite Galbraith's argument that the public sector cannot pass the cost of wage increases onto "someone else," as can a private firm, from several facts: The public sector union is not limited in its wage demands by a fear of reduced demand and more unemployment. The revenue does not come from voluntary purchase but from coercive taxation. A higher proportion of services in the public sector is of the "strategic" variety whose withdrawal is disruptive of the society (e.g., the loss of public transport or postal communications). Hence the strike weapon is a potentially far more powerful one in these services than in most of what Galbraith calls the "industrial heartland" (e.g., the supply of new automobiles, which can be postponed for months or even years without provoking intense outside pressure for a quick ransom to the union).

Perhaps Galbraith feels that, until and unless we develop the overall system of "incomes policy" which he recommends (not with that name), it is only fair to give public sector employees the chance to "countervail" the effects of the strike weapon in the private sector. But if that is what he means he should say so, so that the argument can proceed on proper grounds. It is most important to decide what is the first priority, to build an overall system which will protect the public interest against the varied distortions and inequities of labor monopoly action, or to strive for a thoroughly monopolistic system in the hope that countervailing distortions will more or less offset one another. I believe that, for reasons suggested in this letter, the latter system is likely to be even worse than the present state of affairs (New York City provides a glimmering of what it would be like). But I will join Professor Galbraith willingly in the fight for a public "incomes policy."

RICHARD ABLIN
Jerusalem, Israel

Mr. Ablin is a research economist.

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

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Getting Down to Earth on Earth Day

by Arthur Kanegis

I celebrated Earth Week at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland, the Army's chemical warfare headquarters. The Chemical and Biological Division of the American Ordnance Association, an organization of weapons contractors, held a two-day meeting on "Environmental Pollution" there, and I attended as an observer from a church-supported ecology program. I was pretty much of an oddity. A random sampling of nametags included Pentagon R&D, Army Munitions Command, Navy Materiel Command, Air Force, Rocky Mountain Arsenal (nerve-gas headquarters), Fort Detrick (germ-warfare headquarters), Dow Chemical, Bendix, General Electric, Grumman Aircraft, Olin, Fairchild Hiller, Honeywell, Diamond Shamrock, Monsanto Chemical, DuPont, RCA, Union Carbide, Continental Oil, Philco-Ford, W.R. Grace, Westinghouse, International Harvester, Owens-Corning, Sperry-Rand, Uniroyal, Lockheed, and ITT Research. Also there, identified by their nametags, were A.J. Shanahan and J. Chernack of the CIA. I felt as though I were in the inner meshes of the military-industrial complex. I observed two blacks, one man with long hair, and three women, two of them librarians and one a Ph.D. who ran the

Arthur Kanegis works with the American Friends Service Committee's Ecology Action Program and its NARMIC (National Action/Research on the Military Industrial Complex). He is a co-author of Weapons for Counter-insurgency.

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slide projector and was introduced as a public-relations sex symbol.

The reason the corporate representatives attended was to look into the possibilities of getting federal grants or contracts in the anti-pollution field. A representative of AAI (formerly Aerospace & Armaments Industry) told me as much when I asked him why he was there. He said, "Ninety to 95 per cent of our business is armaments. For example, we're currently working on the (X)M-19 as a successor to the M-16." He continued, "However, like any aggressive company, we're always looking for new areas to expand in. We're looking for contracting opportunities in the environmental pollution field both because of the money and because we think it's a good thing."

An early speaker was S. H. Bass, Jr., the director of the weapons development and engineering lab at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado. He spoke of Project Eagle, an attempt to dispose of surplus war gases that has succeeded Operation Chase, the plan to dump these gases into the sea that public furor and Congressional criticism forced the Army to cancel. Bass said that there were 21,107 M34 GB clusters with 76 nerve-gas bombs in each cluster for a total of 1,604,132 highly dangerous bombs to be disposed of. He said the problem was that opening a cluster shell can set off the fuse. Therefore, the Army is constructing an explosion-proof demilitari-

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zation center with mechanical arms and conveyor belts to punch and drain the agent from the cylinders. Technicians will then burn the explosives out of each bomblet and process the nerve and mustard gas fumes into ordinary pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide, which would then be released into the air. It will cost the taxpayers $10,315,000 to "demilitarize" the nerve gas, $2,933,000 to destroy 420,000 gallons of mustard gas, and $1,351,000 to monitor the air in surrounding areas.

Another speaker was bearded D. William Lacy of the Federal Water Quality Administration of the Department of Interior. He said that 85 per cent of his agency's R&D money was spent through grants and contracts. He said that federal grants could finance up to one million dollars, or 70 per cent of the cost of creating a waste treatment plant for industrial water pollution. He spoke of capital advantages for recycling: rapid tax write-offs, incentives for waste water treatment plants, cost-sharing contracts, and contracts bearing the *full* cost. He noted that the enforcement efforts of his agency, required by the Water Pollution Control Act, had resulted in only one court action and four meetings to try to clean up corporate waste. During the question period, a representative from Monsanto asked him about the Atomic Energy Commission's thermal and radiological water pollution. Lacy answered, "You know I can't touch that question with a 10-foot pole."

A third speaker was Dr. D. Rosenblatt, who had worked both in warfare industries and at Edgewood Arsenal. He started with a joke about the DOD commander who had cleared his speech for this unclassified meeting. He then quoted a line from Kipling, "When it comes to slaughter, do your work in water." However, in today's slaughter the Army must be more concerned about polluting water than they were in Kipling's day, he said. Today's highly toxic warfare materials cannot be washed away by mere water; more sophisticated techniques are required. The sophisticated technique he outlined was: 1) Find the problem area, 2) determine the degree, and 3) destroy the agent. He then began a cartoon show. "The stakes are high," he said and showed a caricature of a rich gambler in a high hat, flashing four aces and raking in stacks of silver money. He used a picture of a fat wife nagging her skinny, droopy-shouldered husband to illustrate his point that it was hard for Edgewood to meet the Army's nagging standards for methods of detection and treatment. As his language became more technical and his subject more abstruse, his cartoons went in the opposite direction. A bacterium with a smile, dressed as a soldier with gun and helmet, drilled to the caption, "Bacteria are trained."

A Modest Proposal

During the panel discussion period that wound up the first day of Earth Week, a representative of the Naval Ordnance Weapons Command showed that the recycling message of the ecology activists had caught on. "Why create the problem in the first place?" he asked. "You could recycle the wastes from TNT to use in the production of a different type of explosive." Dr. Lacy hastened to add that with government grants such recycling could be made to pay for itself.

The discussion shifted. A corporation executive said, "If you went up to any street corner and asked, 'Are you for it (pollution control)?' they'd say yes, but the public is not willing to pay a nickel to control a particular company's pollution." Another panelist chimed in, "Everyone is for environmental control now—it's motherhood some people are against." A third said that it didn't really matter if the public was willing to pay or not, since either way they would—either through higher prices or higher taxes. "He (the consumer) is the one who wants cleaner air, so he should pay for it."

Next morning Dr. K. Jones of the

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National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA) produced charts showing that the amount of NAPCA funds channeled into contracting had risen in comparison to that channeled into the agency, through universities, and through other government agencies. Though there is $180 - $200 million worth of work to be done to clean up pollution from federal facilities, he said, NAPCA is currently under-funded and under-staffed, at a time when more technical people should be participating in solving social problems. He also said that the only court case against a company for interstate pollution his agency had ever brought was against a chicken plant in Shelby, Maryland, and after five years that case was still in litigation.

After the coffee break, H. Tannenbaum of Edgewood spoke of ways the infrared monitoring techniques developed for detecting chemical warfare agents might be used to detect environmental pollution. Laser beams and infrared beams, mounted on tall buildings, could scan cities giving early warning of approaching chemical agent clouds or invading pollutants. He spoke highly of the Long-path Infrared VG Agent Alarm, which could measure the wavelength, and thereby identify the chemical make-up, of the approaching cloud and could map the agent's borders by detecting the temperature of the agent compared to the target background. He showed pictures of a beautiful landscape in a rural valley where GE is spraying contaminants in the air to test detection systems with names like the Ramon Scattering Laser and the CO_2, UV Laser. He did not mention what would happen after any or all these gadgets detected the pollutants, but indicated that pollution detection was a field with lots of R&D and production contracting opportunities for the aerospace industries.

After lunch it was the turn of E.W. Larson of Fort Detrick. He spoke about the Army's biological warfare facilities there. He spoke of airborn microorganisms and their toxic effects, of how to test and increase their source strength and stability, of how to reduce decay rate, control particle size, and promote infectivity. He showed graphs of exotic static cloud chambers and photographs of testing facilities where human volunteers and non-volunteer goats and burros could put their faces in masks and receive infective dosages of biological agents. Then, almost as an afterthought, he suggested that perhaps these same facilities could be used for tests with common air pollutants, to study their effect in increasing the susceptibility of a volunteer to respiratory infections.

I looked around and noticed that some of the representatives were sleeping. Others had gone home and later the rest were to vote to drop the last discussion session and go home early. Those who were still awake heard R. Hauze of the Atlas Chemical Company discuss Army Ammunition Plant pollution and how a new technique might enable Atlas to stay within the Tennessee law for acidity 90 per cent of the time. He showed slides illustrating how Atlas had complied with state color pollution laws by dying its red-water waste a beautiful blue. The company was able to comply with thermal pollution laws in the winter, he said, but it was too much to ask that it do so in the summer as well. He said that Atlas has retrained some of its operators so that they can keep a smokestack producing white smoke more and yellow smoke less, though even the white smoke was "still too much, but it's the best you can do." He said his plant is currently producing 256,513 pounds of water and obnoxious smelling air pollutants per day, but Atlas is spending six million dollars to reduce it. Hauze concluded by telling about an experiment at the Army Ammunition Plant in which 60 black-tailed deer, brought to the area especially for this test, were found to actually enjoy living in a polluted atmosphere, preferring it to clean forest air.

I left my first meeting of the American Ordnance Association a confused man. But I marveled at the foresight of those leaders who decided to locate zoos within the city. ■

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Paying for NATO

by Charles H. Percy

Today, a quarter of a century after the end of World War II, it is time for a thoughtful and comprehensive reassessment of the American commitment to NATO. In terms both of total costs and manpower, the United States is bearing an unfair and staggering burden in the defense of Europe. If the European nations are not getting a free ride, they are at the very least traveling at an absurdly low fare.

At present, there are about 1.2 million American troops stationed overseas. About 25 per cent of them, or 300,000, are located in Europe, with 220,000 in West Germany alone. Moreover, along with our troops in Europe are 242,000 dependents and 14,000 civilian employees—a total of 556,000 Americans in Western Europe. This constitutes a larger American presence than the United States ever has deployed in Indochina, where a war is being fought. The cost of the vast American military presence in Europe places a tremendous drain on the U.S. budget. Each year, it costs the American taxpayers $14 billion to support our troops in NATO. There is also a $1.5 billion balance-of-payments deficit directly tied to our military commitment; $1 billion of that deficit is in Germany alone.

At a time when the United States must turn its resources to an unprecedented array of domestic problems, it is apparent that not even the wealthiest nation in the world can afford to continue its present commitment to NATO. The litany of this nation's internal maladies is by now familiar—a deteriorating environment, racial discord with all of its ugly ramifications, inadequate health care, poverty that touches more than 25 million Americans, cities on the verge of economic and social collapse. If we are to reduce our disproportionately large commitment to NATO to permit us to marshal our resources for the domestic battleground, two possible approaches are open.

The first, a unilateral withdrawal of a portion of our troops from Europe, has the virtue of simplicity and its effects would be felt almost immediately. Sentiment is growing for this approach in the Congress and with the public at large, and if no satisfactory alternative is implemented within the next few months, I am prepared to help lead the fight in the Senate for troop reduction.

But I believe that another option is available—one which will insure that the cost of defending Europe will no longer be primarily an American responsibility, but which also will permit the question of troop commitments to be resolved on military and strategic grounds, not out of economic necessity. I call my approach "burden-sharing," and it simply means that the Europeans will begin to carry a fair share of the expenses of their own defense. It requires no special perception to observe that Europe today is not the rubble-strewn continent it was 25 years ago, or that its reconstructed, thriving economies can bear a much larger defense burden than was possible in the immediate post-war years. Changing conditions demand changing responses. If the European nations do not accept their new responsibilities, and do so quickly, reductions in American troop levels will have passed the point of de-

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bate; they will become inevitable.

The immediate goal of the U.S. should be the cutting of its NATO expenses by $2 billion. If this country found it possible to pare its own annual space expenditures from over $6 billion to $3.3 billion, it should not be difficult to devise ways to trim $2 billion from a total outlay of $14 billion. With the U.S. facing severe economic pressures, with every American aware of the need for budgetary belt-tightening, it is ludicrous for us to continue to shoulder expenses that rightfully should be borne by Europeans. There are several identifiable areas in which Europeans could pick up the cost burden from the U.S.:

1) Salaries of the 74,000 local nationals employed by U.S. forces. These people are working for NATO and just happen to be servicing Americans. In Germany, for example, where 62,000 of the local nationals are employed, we are now paying German citizens—service help, not mercenary soldiers—about $250 million. Why shouldn't the local government assume these costs?

2) Construction costs. Buildings built in Europe for American forces obviously are not going to be brought back to the U.S. when American troops leave, nor are we likely to be reimbursed for them. They should be paid for by the host government.

3) Materials and equipment purchased in the local economy for use in that country.

4) Transportation, power, and various other services. Why should we pay the cost of transporting our troops around Europe when the means of transportation are owned by the local government? And why should we be paying a German government-owned power company to supply us with electricity?

5) NATO infrastructure expenses. Certainly structures like runways and roads cannot be carried back to the U.S.

Just these five categories, if picked up by the European governments, could save the U.S. about $1 billion a year in budgetary costs, about half of it in Germany.

Moreover, it is scandalous that the U.S. government continues to pay millions of dollars annually to its NATO partners in taxes—real property taxes, local and municipal taxes, business and trade taxes, excise taxes, and import taxes. We do not pay taxes to the states and communities in our own country where we have military installations; yet our European allies, the nations we spend billions to protect, have no compunction about adding those surcharges to our costs for our mutual defense. The General Accounting Office, in a detailed report of our tax payments in NATO countries abroad, found taxation to be particularly high in the United Kingdom and Germany, but it is also prevalent in Italy and Belgium. Clearly, U.S. military involvement in NATO should be tax exempt, and I intend to work with the General Accounting Office toward the elimination of this example of an intolerable burden.

Our foreign exchange position has deteriorated not only because of the many unjustifiable expenses we bear due to our NATO commitments, but also

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"It is ludicrous for us to continue shouldering expenses rightfully borne by Europeans."

because of the unsatisfactory agreements we have negotiated in an attempt to offset our balance-of-payments deficits. In the early 1960's, offset arrangements took the form of military purchases by European countries in the U.S., but these purchases have diminished in recent years as European nations began equipping themselves. Since 1967, Germany has offset part of the U.S. balance-of-payments drain by buying $1 billion in bonds from the U.S. Treasury.

But a loan, which must be repaid, cannot be considered a true offset; it merely postpones the agony. Beyond that, the U.S. must repay its offset loans to Germany with interest, which puts this nation in the incredible position of paying money to Germany for the privilege of defending Germans. And finally, as the ultimate insult to our fiscal intelligence, the German Federal Bank—the Bundesbank—called in $500 million worth of offset bonds three years ahead of time. It did so in utter disregard of the comparative economic conditions of our two countries—as measured by the relative stability of the mark and the dollar, the size of our national debt measured against theirs, or any other major indicator—and with no seeming concern for the possible fracturing of our political relationships. Moreover, because of the 9.3 per cent revaluation of the mark, the U.S. will have to repay not $500 million, but $545 million. And, should the Bundesbank wish to cash the remaining $500 million in offset bonds ahead of time, it can do so under the terms of the existing agreements.

These offset arrangements strain credulity to the breaking point. Our troops and dependents are hostages in Europe, designed to insure the credibility of our deterrent, and we are paying money to the nations that are benefiting. Fortunately, however, the current financial arrangements run only until June 30, 1971, at which point I trust they will be terminated. Chairman Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve Board, Secretary of the Treasury David Kennedy, and Budget Bureau Director Robert Mayo concur in my conclusions that the agreements never should have been made.

In an effort to devise a better plan to cover military expenditures within NATO, I have been working with the NATO North Atlantic Assembly since 1968. I presented my plan, which was developed with the cooperation of the U.S. Treasury, to the NATO governments last October and invited them to make suggestions for its improvement. While I am not wedded to every detail of the proposal, I believe its basic concept is sound. It would provide that a clearinghouse be set up by NATO to identify the balance-of-payments gains or losses to each NATO country as a result of its commitment to the common defense and would create a structure for the adjustment of these gains and losses. I have urged that this structure take effect as soon as possible, in order that balance-of-payments adjustments could begin on a multilateral basis on July 1, 1971. This date would coincide with the conclusion of the existing bilateral arrangements between the United States and the United Kingdom and Germany.

This past January, I attended a privately-sponsored meeting of legislators and other prominent Americans and Germans in Bad Godesberg, Germany, at which the financing of the NATO alliance was a prime topic of discussion. Predictably enough, many of the German delegates' initial reaction to my burden-sharing proposals was that it would be politically and economically

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"Buildings built in Europe for American forces will obviously not be brought back to the U.S. when the troops leave. Why pay for them?"

calamitous. I was often chided for being stubborn. Yet after prolonged discussion, I believe my colleagues and I were successful in reaching a consensus with the German participants. We agreed that a reevaluation of the manner in which the U.S. and Europe share the cost of the defense of Europe was needed and that a full range of proposals should be thoroughly examined—including a multilateral arrangement for automatic adjustments in the financial burden, such as the plan I had been working on in the NATO North Atlantic Assembly. During my visit to Germany, I also consulted with Chancellor Willy Brandt, who agreed in principle to the concept of burden-sharing, although he stressed that it would have to be carried out on a multi-national basis. I assumed that his qualification was based on internal political considerations and regarded it as an understandable device.

Our European allies have thus been slowly moving toward recognition of the financial inequities within NATO. Indeed, the NATO defense ministers agreed in June to commission a thorough review of budget responsibilities, with the clear intention of lightening the U.S. load. But no specific dollar commitments have been made, and current plans envision no reforms at all until fiscal 1972.

Having observed the understanding German attitude at the Bad Godesberg conference, I returned to the United States considerably encouraged. As I had learned from my experience in business—during which, as a manufacturer of photographic equipment, I was in direct competition with them for 25 years—the Germans are hard-headed, tough negotiators, but above all they are realists. And they quite clearly understood that the only alternative to some form of burden-sharing would be a major American troop reduction in Europe.

Regrettably, however, European realism does not mean that the road to redistributive action will be easy. Chancellor Brandt, in a subsequent appearance on "Meet the Press," offered two unimpressive arguments to explain why the American commitment to the defense of Europe must be expressed in the present number of troops. First, he said, is the political and psychological factor—in some parts of Europe, a major unilateral withdrawal of American troops from Europe would be regarded as a step toward Soviet hegemony. Secondly, he suggested, a chance exists that during the next few years NATO might be able to enter into serious negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions (BFR) with the Warsaw Pact nations; a precondition to these talks would be an important American presence in Europe.

To Chancellor Brandt's initial argument, I would reply that there are also serious political and psychological problems in the United States, and these must be my paramount concern. A majority of the Senate and growing numbers of the American people are disturbed by our sending billions of dollars overseas at a time when we are enduring a domestic crisis, particularly in view of the conspicuous prosperity of Europe. In my view, if Europe does not offer some tangible evidence that it is willing to make minimal sacrifices to pay for its defense, the public demand for troop reductions in Europe will grow in this country to a point at which no other response will be possible.

The Chancellor's references to BFR are little more than a red herring. American officials with whom I have consulted see virtually no chance of mutual troop reductions in the foreseeable future. They have been mentioned for years, but

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"This nation is in the incredible position of paying money to Germany for the privilige of defending Germans."

always in the conditional, as something that "may" or "might" occur sometime years from now. The reason for the conditional tense is a complete lack of interest to date on the part of the Soviets. Late in May, the NATO foreign ministers invited the Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact powers, and other interested governments to explore mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe. While the proposal sparked some interest in the smaller countries of Eastern Europe, it was, as usual, promptly rejected by Moscow.

If anything, the public remarks of Helmut Schmidt, the Defense Minister of West Germany, have been less persuasive than the arguments of Chancellor Brandt. Defense Minister Schmidt blithely notes that it appears to be a "law of postwar history" that every 10 years a great debate arises over the relationship between U.S. and Europe. The debate he sees "in the offing" revolves about "America's future political position in Europe" and "the number of American troops that will have to be kept in Europe to maintain the credibility of the American commitment to the defense of the Old World." Mr. Schmidt, I suspect, has not been listening; the debate is already several years old. A resolution was introduced in the Senate three years ago calling for substantial reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe. But it was much earlier, in an interview with former President Eisenhower in the October 26, 1963, issue of *The Saturday Evening Post*, that the debate began in earnest. At that time, General Eisenhower said:

> Though for eight years in the White House I believed and announced to my associates that a reduction of American strength in Europe should be initiated as soon as European economies were restored, the matter was then considered too delicate a political question to raise. I believe the time has now come when we should start withdrawing some of those troops.

Mr. Schmidt argues that Germany is not "sitting idly on its haunches, satisfied to leave its defense to Americans." To support this thesis, he states that the West German defense budget for 1970 represents an increase of 6.8 per cent over the previous year. I submit that Mr. Schmidt is neglecting more pertinent statistics, which put the German defense effort truly in context. He fails to mention that, according to the latest figures available, 8.7 per cent of the men of military age in the U.S. are in the armed forces, compared to four per cent in Germany. He slights the fact that in 1969 defense expenditures per capita were $396 in the U.S. and $93 in West Germany; the German figure was lower than those of the United Kingdom and France and the same as that of Norway. He also ignores the fact that in 1969 the portion of American gross national product devoted to defense was 8.7 per cent, compared to 3.5 per cent of the GNP in Germany—a percentage lower than those of the United Kingdom, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Turkey.

Mr. Schmidt concludes his disconcertingly frank presentation with a statement that further offset agreements to balance some portion of the foreign exchange costs the U.S. incurs because of the level of our commitment in Europe will be "difficult." Presumably not even Mr. Schmidt is enchanted with the interest-bearing loans. Budgetary contributions, the defense minister says, "would have to come out of the German defense budget; we would mend one hole by opening up another." In effect,

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"Certainly if this country can Vietnamize the war in Southeast Asia, it should not be impossible to Europeanize the defense of Europe."

he throws up his hands, saying, "I doubt strongly that we can come up with any solutions." His lack of solutions is the basic problem; it is completely unrealistic. It may be true that neither Germany's friends nor her enemies want a significantly larger West German army, and the German public probably would agree. But to argue that the most affluent nation in Europe can neither continue to offset American balance-of-payments losses suffered because of our troops in Europe nor pay a greater share of the budgetary cost of our military presence is not calculated to satisfy either the American Congress or American public opinion. And it should not, at a time when there are so many valid claims on our tax dollars.

Nothing in the foregoing should suggest that the United States will abandon its NATO partners; we have pledged to assist in the defense of Europe, and we will honor our treaty commitments. This country values highly its close friendship with West Germany and with the other nations of Western Europe. But legitimate friendship is based on equity and mutual self-respect. The American burden in the defense of Europe is patently inequitable and, were we to permit it to continue, it would reflect poorly on our judgment and leave our claim to world leadership open to serious question.

The Nixon Administration accepts the concept of Europeans sharing more of the costs of the NATO common defense. Some action will almost certainly be taken before the expiration of the current agreements in the middle of next year, whether it be troop withdrawals or the implementation of a burden-sharing plan. In saying this, I do not wish to appear to be threatening West Germany or the other European nations; I am merely stating the economic facts of life. The time has passed when the United States could afford to devote $14 billion to the defense of Europe. That amount represents $560 annually for each of the approximately 25 million people now living below the federally-defined poverty level in the U.S. Our government would be remiss if it did not appreciate what this money could mean to countless Americans if a substantial part of it were invested in food, housing, education, and medical care for our own citizens.

I can envision no formidable obstacle to a shared responsibility in NATO if there is good faith on both sides. Certainly, if this country can Vietnamize the war in Southeast Asia, it should not be impossible to Europeanize the defense of Europe.

Europe, then, should be our first target in the campaign to return the primary burden for their own defense to the other nations of the world, but it should by no means be the only one. Japan, another highly industrialized, economically self-sufficient nation, now spends less than one per cent of its gross national product on defense, far lower even than the West German figure of 3.5 per cent. Yet Japan profits from the American nuclear umbrella as well as from our vast military establishment in Asia. Equity demands that Japan become a primary candidate for burden-sharing in the years immediately ahead. Though perhaps my stubbornness on this matter of equitable burden-sharing can be traced to my own German heritage, I intend to be equally persistent with Japan and other nations in saying, "There is a limit to American resources. We have a job of nation-building here at home. We do not intend any longer to be the policemen for the world."■

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Violence and the Masculine Mystique

". . . there are worse things than war; and all of them come with defeat. The more you hate war, the more you know that once you are forced into it, for whatever reason it may be, you have to win it."
—from *Men at War* by Ernest Hemingway

"You must perform the act for them, Charlie. You know your function. Kill the enemy. So they will give you recognition of your **manhood** *Charlie. Never your humanity."*
—from the feminist play *Mod Donna* by Myrna Lamb

by Lucy Komisar

"We will not be humiliated," President Nixon declared in his speech to the country after the invasion of Cambodia. "It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight." Agonizing over the spector of an America that acted like "a pitiful, helpless giant," he vowed that he would not see the nation become "a second-rate power" and "accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history."

Nixon's resolve stiffens (masculine) and he sends troops into Cambodia so that we are not forced to submit (feminine) to a peace of humiliation. The big stick hasn't changed much since Teddy Roosevelt, only now it's a stockpile of missiles and bayonets on rifles and bombs that plow gracelessly into a womb that burns with napalm.

The United States of America is "the clear leader among modern, stable, democratic nations in its rates of homicide, assault, rape, and robbery, and it is at least among the highest in incidence of group violence and assassination," declared the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. Most of those violent crimes are committed by males between the ages of 15 and 24; a majority of them are poor and a disproportionate percentage are black.

"Violence is actually often used to enable a young man to become a successful member of ghetto society," reported the Commission. "Proving masculinity may require frequent rehearsal of the toughness, the exploitation of women, and the quick aggressive responses that are characteristic of the lower-class adult male." The report called ghetto life a

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Illustration: New Thing

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"subculture within dominant American middle-class culture in which aggressive violence tends to be accepted as normal in everyday life. . . . An altercation with overtones threatening a young man's masculinity, a misunderstanding between husband and wife, competition for a sexual partner, the need to get hold of a few dollars—these trivial events can readily elicit violent response."

The only thing wrong with that is the Commission's assumption that its observations apply only to the lower classes. What it has described, in fact, is the "masculine mystique," a conception of manhood so central to the politics and personality of America that it institutionalizes violence and male supremacy as measures of national pride. The masculine mystique is based on toughness and domination, qualities that once may have been necessary in a time when men felled trees and slew wild animals. Now they are archaic and destructive values that have no legitimate place in our world but continue to exist as idealized standards for some lofty state of "masculinity." The mystique has characterized many nations, but it is particularly dangerous in contemporary America because of our distinctively high levels of internal violence, our "Bonnie and Clyde" tendencies toward its glorification, our enormous capacities for mechanized warfare, and our virtual obsession with being Number One.

A quote from a man I know: "When I was a little boy and had come home crying after a beating from some local bully, my mother would push me out and lock the door, demanding that I go back to give as good as I had gotten. She said boys who didn't fight back were sissies."

Little boys learn the connection between violence and manhood very early in life. Fathers indulge in mock prize fights and wrestling matches with eight-year-olds. Boys play cowboys and Indians with guns and bows and arrows proffered by their elders. They are gangsters or soldiers interchangeably—the lack of difference between the two is more evident to them than to their parents. They are encouraged to "fight back," and bloodied noses and black eyes become trophies of their pint-sized virility.

Little Men

The differences between boys and girls are defined in terms of violence. Boys are encouraged to rough-house; girls are taught to be gentle ("ladylike"). Boys are expected to get into fights, but admonished not to hit girls. (It is not "manly" to assault females—except, of course, sexually, but that comes later.) Boys who run away from fights are "sissies," with the implication that they are queer. As little boys become big boys, their education in violence continues. The leadership in this country today consists of such little boys who attained "manhood" in the approved and heroic violence of World War II. They returned to a society in which street and motorcycle gangs, fast cars, and fraternity hazing confirmed the lessons of war—one must be tough and ready to inflict pain in order to get ahead.

The phallic/power symbol of our age is, of course, the automobile. The World Health Organization says that traffic accidents are the most common cause of death among young males in highly motorized countries. Often cars are stolen not to keep or sell, but for the joy of the ride and the sense of power and controlled violence it offers. Madison Avenue contributes its influence by selling cars as if they were magical potency potions. Chivalry's knight on horseback has become man on "horsepower"—even modern terminology substantiates the metaphor.

A young philosophy instructor at a Catholic men's college in New Jersey, who leads a "consciousness-raising" group for some of his students, says most of them have grown up with the same conception of what it takes to prove one's manhood: "You have a car and 'make' as many girls as possible. It's

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very important to have an impressive car; the freshmen all believe the ads that if you've got a Dodge Charger, you're going to get laid more." The system militates against tenderness, he says. "No physical display between men is acceptable except to fight, and the *only* acceptable response when someone questions your manhood is to fight. Most freshmen think there's something faggoty about being a draft dodger."

He adds, "Some guys are so obsessed with their manhood and masculinity that they can't make love: they feel it's effeminate to be sensitive or affectionate."

Boys are introduced into "manhood" through innocent pastimes like boxing, brawling, and football. And not-so-innocent pastimes like war. Consider phrases like "The manly art of self defense," "Join the army, be a man" (variation: "The army will make a man out of him"). Gene Tunney's autobiography is called simply *A Man Must Fight.* Men who have been brought up in this tradition, and whose memories of war, real or imagined, have bolstered their self-respect during years of bringing home the bacon, are traumatized by the young men (students and peace marchers) who refuse to accept pain, mutilation, and death as initiation rites into manhood.

Even at a time when the protest leader is beginning to replace the football star as campus hero, football remains a passion with a large number of American men. The game, with its crashing, smashing bodies and carefully controlled violence, deserves a closer scrutiny to see how it reflects the quest for manhood.

The Great Touchdown of Virility

For the past half dozen years, I have observed the phenomenon of the masculine mystique operating on a group of newspapermen who frequent a bar in my neighborhood. They drink heavily, rhapsodize about prize fighters and men who earn their living by physical labor, share football afternoons watching the barroom television, and treat women mostly as "dumb broads" to be taken in bed and ignored in serious conversation. There are some exceptions.

Several of them urged me to read Frederick Exley's *A Fan's Notes,* an autobiographical novel which had been nominated for the National Book Award. I read it and realized how it must



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have been a mirror for many of them—yet neither they nor Exley appear to have understood the significance and the logic of his story.

The book's Fred Exley is an impotent writer (impotent in his work and, in one episode, impotent in bed) who seeks fame and recognition and whose hero is Giant's football player Frank Gifford. Exley's father was a tough, athletic, working-class man whose drinking often ended in violence. The son longs for "some sunnier past" when men could prove their virility with the muscles in their arms. His book never indicates any recognition of the fact that his idolatry of football and of the hard-drinking laborer—and his exploitation of women—mask the fear that he is "unmanly," that he is "womanish"—the epithet he uses to describe a despised Hollywood publicist. His anguished search is futile, for he reaches out for a definition of manhood that can no longer exist for most men, except through the shallow medium of television. Exley's own words offer a vivid picture of the masculine mystique. First the football hero as symbol of the time when manhood was easily defined and won by power and dominance:

> Why did football bring me so to life? I can't say precisely. Part of it was my feeling that football was an island of directness in a world of circumspection. In football a man was asked to do a difficult and brutal job, and he either did it or got out. There was nothing rhetorical or vague about it; I chose to believe that it was not unlike the jobs which all men, in some sunnier past, had been called upon to do. It smacked of something old, something traditional, something unclouded by legerdemain and subterfuge. It had that kind of power over me, drawing me back with the force of something known, scarcely remembered, elusive as integrity—perhaps it was no more than the force of a forgotten childhood. Whatever it was, I gave myself up to the Giants utterly. The recompense I gained was the feeling of being alive.

Then, Exley's image of his father as the symbol of the virility he seeks to attain:

> . . . my father was "tough" . . . . He supported his family by climbing telephone poles for the Niagara Mohawk (until he was fired for fighting); and when I think of him now, I think of rough-cotton work shirts open at the collar, a broad masculine face made ruddy by exposure and a Camel cigarette dangling from the corner of his pensive mouth. There was nothing about him that did not suggest his complete awareness that he got his bread by the sweat of his brow and the power of his back. He seemed like almost the prototype of the plebian. Yet my father had more refined dreams. Like most athletes he lived amidst the large deeds and ephemeral glories of the past, recalling a time when it must have seemed more Elevated . . . . Moreover, in an attempt to more vividly recreate that past, my father drank—I was about to say too much, which would not be entirely accurate. My father could not, or so my mother recalls, drink even the most limited amounts of beer without becoming moody, argumentative, and even violent; and on one occasion he beat a man so badly that the man had to have pulled what few teeth my father left him.

Lastly, Exley's certainty that he had failed the test of masculinity in the eyes of his father. He was a small boy being introduced to Steve Owen, the coach of the Giants:

> "Are you tough?" Owen asked.
> "Pardon, sir?"
> *"Are you tough?"*
> "I don't know, sir."
> Owen looked at my father. "Is he tough, Mr. Exley?"
> Though more than anything I wanted my father to say that I was, I was not surprised at his answer.
> "It's too soon to tell."

Hunting, bullfighting, cockfighting. Is it a more "humane" sport to shoot an animal for the pure joy of watching it fall or more "virile" to torture it slowly under the guise of letting it fight back—and subjecting the killer to the threat of death himself? What thrilling, "macho" feeling overcomes spectators at the gruesome sight of two male chickens with

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metal spurs attached to their feet fiercely hacking each other to bits? Ernest Hemingway went to his own violent death without making all that perfectly clear.

How far is it from the glorification of man killing animals to what amounted to national admiration for the killers of the Prohibition era and the men who terrorized the country with gangland power? After all, Dutch Schultz and Al Capone were only following in the heroic, virile tradition of Billy the Kid and the James brothers. And like Hemingway's bullfighters, they did everything with flamboyant style. In 1872, a Kansas City newspaper, reporting a robbery in which a little girl was shot in the leg, called it "so diabolically daring and so utterly in contempt of fear that we are bound to admire it and revere its perpetrators." Still dripping with nobility a few days later, it said that the robbers had carried out their crime "with the halo of medieval chivalry upon their garments." The criminals were thought to be Frank and Jesse James.

If manhood is equivalent to strength and power, those attributes must be constantly tested and proven to new challengers. "I knew a guy who was very short," a friend of mine recalls. "He told me that he used to fantasize that he was Audie Murphy. He would go into a working-class bar where nobody knew him and he'd do this act. He'd sit at the bar, maybe for a half hour and growl at the bartender. After a while, someone would come over and maybe say something or poke him on the shoulder, and he'd spin around and hit the guy over the head with a beer bottle. He was always sitting there waiting for someone to provoke him, and he always had the bottle ready."

Some people say men fight in bars because they get drunk, but that has nothing to do with it. Men fight in bars because that's the only place where it's allowed. (That is probably the reason why Exley's father got into fights after only a few beers.) Society instills feelings in men that they ought to fight and then makes it illegal—except in war. Working-class bars are 'masculine' places—the football on TV, the absence of women, and the fights are all part of the effort to recapture that lost ideal.

Postscript: On May 29, a short item buried in the back pages of *The New York Times* reported that actor Audie Murphy, America's most decorated soldier in World War II, had been booked for assault with intent to commit murder after a gun went off during a fight he had with a dog trainer.

In the old West ("where men were men and women were women") gunfighters were often called on to prove themselves in duels with younger men who wagered their lives against the chance to be known as "the man who shot the fastest gun in . . . , etc." Today's shoot-em-ups in defense of manhood unfortunately tend to involve more than the principals.

The Soft Battlefield

The ultimate proof of manhood, however, is in sexual violence. Even the language of sex is a lexicon that describes the power of men over women. Men are "aggressive" as they "take" or "make" women, showing their potency ("power") in the "conquest." Women, on the other hand, "submit" and "surrender," allowing themselves to be "violated" and "possessed." Havelock Ellis declares the basic sado-masochism of such a concept to be "certainly normal." He says: "In men it is possible to trace a tendency to inflict pain on the women they love. It is still easier to trace in women a delight in experiencing physical pain when it is inflicted by a lover and an eagerness to accept subjection to his will."

Sadism *cum* virility is offered the fans who flock to James Bond films to see their hero play out their fantasies alternately in sensual embraces with women and bloody combat with men. In "Goldfinger," for instance, Bond has his arms

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around a chorus girl when he sees the reflection of an assassin in her eye. He wards off the blow with her body, a consummation which seems as satisfying to his manhood as the one he originally had in mind. There is as little tenderness and as much brutality in the sexual encounters as in the fight scenes. If homosexuality were in fashion, it is likely that James Bond could make love to the men and beat up the women without changing his sentiments toward either.

Chivalry was an early example of the worship of masculine violence tied in with sexual dominance. Then and later, duels were fought to protect the honor of women and wars waged to uphold the honor of states. In the latter endeavor, the women were raped instead of honored. Both traditions have been proudly continued, and in both the women have been objects to conquer and to parade as the validation of someone's manhood: *they have no honor of their own.*

Rape on foreign battlefields has always been met on the homefront with shrugs about men having certain "needs" and the "tensions" that build up in wartime. So soldiers get penicillin along with their K-rations, and they express their "manhood" by forcing women to submit to them. Those that lie with prostitutes are participating in rape in just as real a sense—they are enjoying the bitter fruits of the rape of a country that forces its



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citizens to choose between death and degradation.

In 1966, an American patrol held a 19-year-old Vietnamese girl captive for several days, taking turns raping her and finally murdering her. The sergeant planned the crime in advance, telling the soldiers during the mission's briefing that the girl would improve their "morale." When one soldier refused to take part in the rape, the sergeant called him "queer" and "chicken;" another testified later that he joined in the assault to avoid such insults. When one *country* ravages another to avoid being called "chicken," how unusual is it that soldiers follow suit? Both in the name of that elusive "manhood."

According to Seymour Hersh, some of the GIs who conducted the My Lai massacre raped women before they shot them. The day after that "mission," an entire platoon raped a woman caught fleeing a burning hut. And a couple of days later a helicopter door gunner spotted the body of a woman in a field. She was spread-eagled, with an Eleventh Brigade patch between her legs. Like a "badge of honor," reported the gunner. "It was obviously there so people would know the Eleventh Brigade had been there."

Machismo and the Don Juan cult, modern versions of chivalry, are brushed off as Latin oddities. Spaniards and Italians defend their honor with "passion killings"—and everyone winks. But they are not the only men who regard women as trophies in rape or seduction or who think wife-beating is a joke (literally, as in "When did you stop beating your wife?"). How different are those passion killings from Southern lynchings conducted in the name of white womanhood and against the imagined sexual onslaughts of black men? It is not a coincidence that white supremacy in the South organized the "Knights" of the Ku Klux Klan. That was an assertion of masculinity in the face of humiliation by other men; it was as much male supremacy as white supremacy.

The writing of Eldridge Cleaver epitomizes the way in which many black men, too, hold violence equivalent to masculinity, fully in the American tradition. "The boxing ring is the ultimate focus of masculinity in America," says Cleaver in *Soul on Ice;* "the two-fisted testing ground of manhood, and the heavyweight champion, as a symbol, is the real Mr. America." Cleaver recognizes the historical significance of violence in our culture:

> Whether we quench our thirst from the sight of a bleeding Jesus on the Cross, from the ritualized sacrifice in the elevation of the Host and the consecration of the Blood of the Son, or from bullfighting, cockfighting, dogfighting, wrestling or boxing, spiced with our Occidental memory and heritage of the gladiators of Rome and the mass spectator sport of the time of feeding Christians and other enemies of society to the lions in the Coliseum—whatever the mask assumed by the impulse, the persistent beat of the drum over the years intones the chant.

However, his own cry is not a protest against that definition of masculinity but anguish that black men cannot live up to it:

> In back rooms, in dark stinking corners of the ghettos, self-conscious black men curse their own cowardice and stare at their rifles and pistols and shotguns laid out on tables before them, trembling as they wish for a manly impulse to course through their bodies and send them screaming mad into the streets shooting from the hip. Black women look at their men as if they are bugs . . . .

Hemingway and Mailer: The Bulls of Literature

Alan Sillitoe, author of "Saturday Night and Sunday Morning," writes: "An intellectual obsession with violence is a sign of fear. A physical obsession with it is a sign of sexual impotence." Interesting, then, that Ernest Hemingway, who composed hosannas to manly brutality, took his own life with a gun and that Norman Mailer, one of

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America's most self-conscious "machos," once stabbed his wife and has been in more than one barroom and cocktail party brawl.

In 1927, Hemingway published *Men Without Women,* a collection of stories which I expect reflect his conception of ultimate manhood. The stories are variously written about a bullfighter, a boxer, several soldiers, some hired gunmen, etc. Women are represented as unwelcomely pregnant (in a story pointedly titled "White Elephants"); as prostitutes, as deceivers, or as fools. Ultimately, Hemingway's answer is to eschew women for more "masculine" pastimes—fishing, for example:

> I lay in the dark with my eyes open and thought of all the girls I had ever known and what kind of wives they would make. It was a very interesting thing to think about and for a while it killed off trout-fishing and interfered with my prayers. Finally, though, I went back to trout-fishing, because I found that I could remember all the streams and there was always something new about them while the girls, after I had thought about them a few times, blurred and I could not call them into my mind and finally they all blurred and all became rather the same and I gave up thinking about them almost altogether. ("Now I Lay Me")

Critic Leslie Fiedler thinks Hemingway's concern with violence reflects a pathological inability to deal with adult sexuality. If, as Sillitoe says, obsession with violence is a sign of impotence, trading women for fish is one way to avoid that embarrassing confrontation.

Mailer is more extravagant than Hemingway in his exaltation of violence: "Men who have lived a great deal with violence are usually gentler and more tolerant than men who abhor violence," he says. "Boxers, bullfighters, a lot of combat soldiers, Hemingway heroes, in short, are almost always gentle men."

What romantic drivel! My Lai, cauliflower ears and broken noses, slit throats, cement blocks splashing into Mafia cemeteries, guts spilling out of gored intestines—do the actors in such violent dramas radiate the compassion and understanding Mailer attributes to them? Not to mention the Chicago police Mailer himself has had occasion to describe without recourse to adjectives like "gentle" or "tolerant."

If Mailer's ideal man of the world is described in such incredible terms, what about his man in bed? Sex is conquest, a contest, an opportunity for domination. Mailer compares the "event" in bed to the bullfight. Sometimes he sees himself as the matador, sometimes as the bull. He calls his penis "the avenger" (For what "crime" or "insult" does he avenge himself against women?) and he recalls how he "threw her a fuck the equivalent of a 15-round fight."

In *Sexual Politics* (published this month by Doubleday), feminist Kate Millet devotes an entire chapter to an analysis of Mailer's obsession with violence, showing how his equation of violence and masculinity masks an overriding fear of homosexuality as well as a contempt for women. Beginning with *The Naked and the Dead*, Mailer could barely speak either of sex or violence in terms that did not include the other. Millet cites a speech by Sergeant Croft:

> All the deep dark urges of man, the sacrifices on the hilltop, the churning lusts of night and sleep, weren't all of them contained in the shattering, screaming burst of a shell . . . the phallus-shell that rides through a shining vagina of steel . . . the curve of sexual excitement and discharge, which is after all the physical core of life.

Mailer equates the opposite of violence—pacifism—with the opposites of maleness—femaleness and homosexuality—both of which arouse his contempt. The logical outcome of this ideology, says Millet, is war and violence, the only protection against the pacifism he labels "unmanly." And the violence that Mailer venerates is the logical extension and proof of the aggressiveness this society considers an innate part of the truly masculine personality. "Men are

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aggressive, women are passive," says the conventional wisdom. "Men are dominant and venturesome; women are yielding and receptive." The dictionary definition of passive is "inactive, but acted upon; offering no resistance, submissive; taking no part, inert." That sounds more like a vegetable than a human being of *any* sex.

The truth of the matter is that neither men nor women are born "aggressive" or "passive"; the values of masculinity and femininity (as this society sees them) are drummed into them by parents, teachers, the media, and other agents of social education. The California Gender Identity Center, for one, has discovered that it is easier to use surgery to change the sex of an adolescent male who has been erroniously brought up as a female than to undo the cultural conditioning that has made him act like a woman. The report of the Center concludes that masculine and feminine roles are determined by *social forces*, not by the nature of a person's genitals.

In other words, this society has inculcated values of aggression and dominance in males and those values have led logically to violence and destruction in the name of good old, unadulterated manhood. Behavioral scientists back up this assertion with their own investigations and analyses. Sometimes teenage delinquents play the same games adults do—they hope to preserve their honor through "cold wars" without resorting to actual battle. Anthropologist Walter Miller, who studied gangs in the 1950's, observed a number of groups in full-scale war preparations 15 times; only once did they escalate into conflict. "A major objective of the gang members was to put themselves in the position of fighting without actually having to fight." They often avoided warfare by tipping off the police or "reluctantly" accepting mediation from social workers.

The similarity between saber-rattling by teenage delinquents and modern nation-states is obvious. "Gang members fight to secure and defend their honor as males; to secure and defend the reputation of their local areas and the honor of their women; to show that an affront to their pride and dignity demands retaliation," says Miller, adding almost unnecessarily that "great nations engage in national wars for almost identical reasons." (The "theatre of war" is a fit appellation for the locus of this kind of masculine play-acting.) Miller concludes that teenage violence and international warfare stem from the same pathological root.

An End to the Game

Violence and male supremacy have been companions in the course of civilization. The domination of women by men has been the prototype of the control men have tried to exercise over other men—in slavery, in war, and in the marketplace. Bernard Clark, professor of government at the London School of Economics, speaks glowingly of "the fierce masculine joy of striving for possession according to some more or less acknowledged rules of a game." That is the game that President Nixon plays, the game that wins acclaim from Hemingway and Mailer, the game that enshrined Jesse James as a national hero, and the game that spills buckets of human blood and guts on battlefields at home and abroad.

That game says that to be a man one must possess, control, dominate—and that domination must be assured by force and violence. Masculinity is interpreted to *demand* male supremacy. Ironically, now in the black community, men are calling on women to step back so that they can "assert their manhood." The "masculinity game" can't have a winner unless it also has a loser. The rules of the game require that the losers be reduced to humiliation and powerlessness—to the classic status of women. Such was the "emasculation" of black men under slavery and segregation. And consequently, they know that the reassertion of that kind of "manhood" re-

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quires the suppression of their women.

John Wayne is the quintessential player in The Game. His role in "The Green Berets" would be an embarrassing parody if patriotic zeal were not immune to wit. Wayne is tough-fisted, hard-talking, and never walks away from a fight; thanks to providence, righteousness, and his rugged, muscular frame, he never loses. But it never happens in real life like in the movies. They probably wouldn't like the metaphor, but the "hard hats" constitute a Greek chorus to masculinity—they extol it through physical labor, vulgar comments at passing women, and patriotic fervor for "our brave fighting men in Vietnam." Sometimes the defense of their manhood, otherwise largely expressed through applauding someone else's violence, forces them to beat up people who disagree with them.

The enemies of national "virility" are called "effete," a word that means "sterile, spent, worn-out" and conjures up the picture of an effeminate pantywaist—the inveterate 90-pound weakling who is always getting sand kicked in his face, probably by a burly construction worker. More to the point, effete comes from "out" plus "fetus"—exhausted by bearing.

Perhaps we *are* "exhausted by bearing"—tired to death of bearing up under the super-masculine mystique that is a national neurosis and that sets a country to counting bodies the way it counts touchdowns—and cataloguing both as a measure of its manhood.

Is it only coincidental that in the early morning hours of the last demonstration of outrage at the invasion of Cambodia and the deaths of American college students, President Nixon was compelled to talk about football—or that he repeated that theme in May at a Billy Graham rally in Knoxville, Tennessee?

"As one who warmed the bench for four years, it's finally good to get out on the football field here at Volunteer Stadium," he said. "And even if we're on the 20-yard line, we're going to be over that goal line before we're through." Nixon talks about "our-brave-fighting-men-in-Vietnam" as if they were Fred Exley's Giants—the essence of manhood wrapped up in hard hats and shoulder pads. All America has to suffer because young Richard Nixon never made the team.

Ironically, the "he-men" who occupy the ringside seats at prize fights, football games, and wars don't recognize the significant difference between their "masculinity" and that of the athlete and frontiersman they adulate. They generally enjoy their violence *vicariously*; there is no call for personal courage. Richard Nixon is *still* warming the bench, and sending others to shoot Vietnamese villagers or scorch them with napalm is hardly an exercise in bravery.

The President is the symbol of a country with a castration complex—a nation that feels its manhood already wilted by the refusal of the Viet Cong to spread its legs for the gang-bang we have organized.

The beginning of a challenge to the masculine mystique of violence and domination comes now from those who were its first victims: women. Today women are demanding new definitions of masculine and feminine that do not require the dominance of one sex over the other. We have rejected all the myths about masculine aggression and feminine passivity and we seek to replace them with values that encourage human relations based on equality, compassion, and respect.

Today the masculine mystique is no longer just a matter of concern for the women who have suffered its ill effects most universally. The caveman mentality outlived its usefulness when technology made the hunter obsolete, and its extension into national and international politics now threatens to destroy everything men *and women* have built since then.

Today men need a kind of courage that is only exhibited by those who have no doubts at all about their *manhood*—and that is the courage to assert their *humanity*. ■

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

CONUS Revisited: The Army Covers Up

by Christopher H. Pyle

The Army still watches civilian politics. Despite over 50 Congressional inquiries, the threat of House and Senate hearings, and a lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union, more than 1,000 plainclothes soldier-agents continue to monitor the political activities of law-abiding citizens.

Some reforms have occurred since this blanket surveillance was first revealed in the January issue of this magazine. The Army has admitted that its CONUS (Continental U.S.) intelligence program exceeded its needs in preparing for riots and has agreed to cut it back. It has also promised to destroy two widely circulated "blacklists" on dissenters and to scrap its computerized data banks containing records on the membership, ideology, programs, and practices of virtually every activist political group in the country, from the violence-prone Weathermen to the non-violent Urban League. Important as these reforms are, however, they are deceptive.

Christopher H. Pyle, a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University, recently completed two years' service as a captain in Army Intelligence. None of the information in this article carries a security classification of any kind.

Illustration: New Thing

The First Plausible Denials

When *The Washington Monthly* reached the newsstands on January 9, the Army high command dove for cover. The Pentagon's office of Public Information refused to comment. Reporters were told to submit their questions in writing. From its headquarters at Fort Holabird in Baltimore, the Army Intelligence Command flashed orders to each of its intelligence groups limiting the collection of domestic intelligence to only the most "essential elements of information." Agents were forbidden to discuss any aspect of the program with newsmen and were warned that any who did

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would be prosecuted for breach of national security. From his office on the second floor of the Pentagon, Robert E. Jordan III, Army General Counsel and Special Assistant to the Secretary for Civil Functions, suspended all replies to Congressional inquiries. In violation of its own regulations, the Army even refused to acknowledge receipt of them.

By the end of the month, however, the rising tide of criticism could not be ignored. Recognizing this, the Army issued, on January 26, the first in a series of partial admissions. In the jargon of the spy trade, such admissions are known as "plausible denials," because they are invested with just enough truth to mask an essential falsehood. Thus the Army confirmed the existence of the nationwide intelligence apparatus (true), but said that it collected political intelligence only "in connection with Army civil disturbance responsibilities" (false). "Civil disturbance incident reports are transmitted over [an] . . . automatic voice network teletype system to the U.S. Army Intelligence Command headquarters" (true) and "information on incidents by types and geographical location is placed in the data bank from keypunched cards" (also true). But: "This is incident information only and does not include individual biographies or personality data" (false).

The statement also acknowledged that the Army "does publish an identification list, sometimes with photos, of persons who have been active in past civil disturbance activity" (true), but failed to mention that the list (actually a booklet) also contained detailed descriptions of persons and organizations never involved in civil disturbances.

Finally, the Army admitted in a backhanded way that its agents had infiltrated civilian political groups: "For some time there has been a special prohibition against military persons undertaking such activities as undercover operations in the civilian community." Of course, it did not say when the order was issued, or whether it was being obeyed. (It is not.)

The "plausible denials" satisfied no one. Inquiries directed to the Secretary of the Army, Stanley R. Resor, poured forth from both Houses of Congress. Legislators of such diverse persuasions as Senators Williams of Delaware, Hart of Michigan, Dole of Kansas, Brooke of Massachusetts, Percy of Illinois, Fulbright of Arkansas, and Cook of Kentucky demanded to know if the charges were true and, if so, by what authority and for what purpose the Army was spying on law-abiding citizens.

Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher (D-N.J.), Chairman of the House Invasion of Privacy Subcommittee, and Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D-N.C.), Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, led the attack. Gallagher wrote to Secretary Resor on January 26: "I am deeply concerned about the implications of collecting dossiers on Americans who are pursuing constitutionally protected activities, especially when they are to be imbedded in immediately available form in a computerized data system."

Senator Ervin, a member of the Armed Services Committee and a former judge, was more outspoken. "The Army," he said in a Senate speech on February 2, "has no business operating data banks for the surveillance of private citizens; nor do they have any business in domestic politics."

When the Army continued to avoid inquiries during the month of February, however, members of Congress expressed annoyance at being ignored. Congressman Gallagher, usually a staunch friend of the military, was especially fed up. After waiting over two weeks for the Army to acknowledge his letter, he threatened to hold hearings.

Still the Army stalled for time. It had good reason. Like Congress and the public, its civilian hierarchy first learned of the Intelligence Command's unbridled curiosity from the press. Unable to learn more from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, who greatly downplayed the CONUS system's capabilities, the civilians resolved to conduct their own in-

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quiry. This reached a point of revelation sometime in mid-February when Army General Counsel Jordan went to Fort Holabird and watched as the computer bank on dissidents disgorged a lengthy print-out on Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.

On February 25, Jordan dispatched the Army's first reply to more than 30 Congressional critics. Each received the same letter, regardless of the questions he had asked. It opened with a lengthy defense of the Intelligence Command's library of security clearance dossiers —never at issue—and closed with a brief confession: "There have been some activities which have been undertaken in the civil disturbance field which, on review, have been determined to be beyond the Army's mission requirements."

"For example, the Intelligence Command published . . . an identification list which included the names and descriptions of individuals who might become involved in civil disturbance situations." And: "The Intelligence Command has operated a computer data bank . . . which included information about potential incidents and individuals involved in potential civil disturbance incidents."

Jordan assured members of Congress that both the identification list and the data bank had been ordered destroyed. "Thus," he concluded, "the Army does not currently maintain the identification list referred to above. No computer data bank of civil disturbance information is being maintained . . . ."

Again, the denials were both plausible and deceptive. Jordan's seemingly candid letter failed to mention that in addition to the Fort Holabird computer (an IBM 1401) and the Intelligence Command's identification list (published in over 330 copies), the Army also maintained:

1) **over 375 copies of a two-volume, loose-leaf encyclopedia on dissent entitled "Counterintelligence Research Project: Cities and Organizations of Interest and Individuals of Interest" but popularly known as "the Compendium."** Compiled by the domestic intelligence section of the Counterintelligence Analysis Division (CIAD), a Pentagon-based unit responsible for briefing high Army officials like Jordan on protest politics, the Compendium contained descriptions of hundreds of organizations and individuals, including the John Birch Society, the Urban League, the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, Negro playwright LeRoi Jones, and the late Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

2) **a computer-indexed, microfilm archive of intelligence reports, newspaper clippings, and other records of political protests and civil disturbances at CIAD headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia.** The index to this data bank is a computer print-out, 50 lines to a page, a foot-and-a-half thick. It catalogues microfilmed documents relating to such groups as Young Americans for Freedom, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Individuals listed include Rear Admiral Arnold E. True and Brigadier General Hugh B. Hester (war critics), Georgia State Representative Julian Bond, and folk singers Joan Baez, Phil Ochs, and Arlo Guthrie.

3) **a computerized data bank on civil disturbances, political protests, and "resistance in the Army (RITA)" at the Continental Army Command headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia.** The civil disturbance-political protest side of this data bank was developed because the Continental Army Command hoped to recapture supervision of its riot control troops from the Pentagon's special 180-man Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations.

4) **non-computerized regional data banks at each stateside Army command and at many military installations.** In addition to the usual agent reports, incident reports, and newspaper clippings, these records include booklet-size "CONUS intelligence summaries" published each month by the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Armies, and the Military District of Washington.

5) **non-computerized files at most of the Intelligence Command's 300 state-**

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side intelligence group offices. These records on local political groups and individuals are similar to, but more detailed than, the records at Fort Holabird which the Army promised to destroy. The political files of the 108th Military Intelligence Group's Manhattan offices, for example, take up five four-drawer file cabinets and require a full-time custodian.

Congressional reactions to Jordan's admissions, omissions, and denials were mixed. Congressman Gallagher—although fully aware of the omissions—seemed pleased. Without withdrawing his threat of hearings, he announced to the press that the Army would no longer keep tabs on peaceful demonstrations or publish a list of individuals who might be involved in a riot. His announcement, repeated in interviews over the weekend, became the basis of widespread and erroneous newspaper reports. *The New York Times* of February 27 was typical: "Army Ends Watch on Civil Protests." Gallagher got the credit for the apparent victory.

Other members of Congress were slower to react and before they did Morton Kondracke of *The Chicago Sun-Times* reported on February 28: "The Army acknowledged yesterday that it maintains files on the political activities of civilians other than the computerized political data bank it told Congressmen it was closing down." Kondracke, a thorough reporter, listed them all.

The following Monday, Senator Ervin expressed his dissatisfaction with Jordan's letter. In a letter to the Secretary of the Army he reiterated his demand for a complete report to Congress, and in a Senate floor speech denounced the surveillance as a "usurpation of authority." "The business of the Army in [civil disturbance] . . . situations is to know about the conditions of highways, bridges, and facilities. It is not to predict trends and reactions by keeping track of the thoughts and actions of Americans exercising first amendment freedoms."

"If there ever were a case of military overkill," he added, "this is it . . . . I suggest the Army regroup and define its strategic objectives, lower its sights, and reidentify its enemy. Under our Constitution that enemy is not the American citizen."

The Army Regroups

Within the Army, much regrouping was already going on. A letter received by Congressman Gallagher from sources close to the 116th Military Intelligence Group at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., described what was happening at the lower echelons:

> On the morning after news reports about the dismantling of the CONUS system first appeared in the Washington papers . . . members of the 116th were . . . informed that their unit and its operations would be unaffected . . . . They were told that the only major effect of the Congressional and press criticism would be destruction of the national data bank and related files that were kept at Fort Holabird. Files kept by the regional M.I. Groups (which were the basis for the Fort Holabird file and contained more information) would remain intact, and members of the M.I. Groups would continue their operations of surveillance, infiltration, and reporting as previously.
>
> In addition, all files and operations of the 116th were to be classified to prevent the release of any information about them; disclosure of such information would subject people who released that information to court-martial or prosecution in civilian court for violation of national security.
>
> At the present time, the files of the 116th M.I. Group consist of a 5x7 card file on several thousand persons in the Washington area. On these cards are a picture of each person, his name and address, occupation, background, a record of political groups with which he has been affiliated, notes on political meetings, rallies, and demonstrations which he has attended, and summaries of his views on political issues.
>
> To gather such information, the 116th routinely assigns some 20 of its men as full-time undercover agents to infiltrate

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political groups and observe politically active persons . . . . Some of these officers have grown beards and long hair to pass as students on local college campuses. In addition, other members pose as members of the working press to obtain pictures of those involved in political activities; concealed tape recorders are also commonly used to record speeches and conversations at political events. Until very recently the 116th's standard equipment also included a full TV video-tape camera and sound truck labeled "Mid-West News," which was used to record major demonstrations.

Higher up the chain of command, officials at Fort Holabird also balked at carrying out the new policy. Questioned by Joseph Hanlon of *Computerworld* on March 10, an Intelligence Command spokesman refused to say whether the computer tapes there had actually been erased or merely placed in storage. He admitted, however, that the "input" to the data bank (presumably the keypunch cards) had not been destroyed.

Higher still, the civilians supposedly in charge of the Army struggled to find out what their military subordinates were doing. Robert Jordan, surprised by the *Washington Monthly* article and by his pilgrimage to the Fort Holabird computer, was taken aback once more on February 27 during a conference with Congressman Gallagher. Asked why his letter made no mention of the microfilm archives at CIAD, he replied: "I'll have to check into that."

To help Jordan out, Secretary Resor wrote to the Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, on March 5: "I would appreciate your asking all commanders in CONUS, Alaska, and Hawaii down to the installation level to report whether their command has any form of computerized data bank relating to civilians or civilian activities, other than data banks dealing with routine administrative matters . . . ."

The Under Secretary Tries His Hand

The results of this canvass have not been made known, but on March 20 Under Secretary of the Army Thaddeus R. Beal wrote long letters to both Ervin and Gallagher. He claimed: "The only other 'intelligence files' concerning civilians maintained by the Army consist of the files maintained by the Counterintelligence Analysis Division."

No reference was made in either letter to: 1) the Continental Army Command's computer files at Fort Monroe, about which Gallagher had made specific inquiries; 2) the regional data banks kept by most of the 300 offices of the Army Intelligence Command; or 3) similar records maintained by the G-2s (intelligence officers) of each stateside Army command and of many Army posts.

The microfilm archives at CIAD, Beal

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went on to say, contain only "limited files concerning political activity" in keeping with that unit's responsibility "for identifying factors which affect civil disturbance potential . . . ." He did not mention that these files take up over 200 rolls of microfilm, at 500 frames a roll. Nor did he acknowledge that the unit's domestic intelligence section, which is larger than any of its foreign intelligence sections, had charged its "left wing," "right wing," and "racial" desks with maintaining detailed card files on dissident individuals and groups. These files are in addition to mounds of current FBI and Army reports and newspaper clippings which are coded on key-punch cards (for the computerized index) and recorded on microfilm.

The Under Secretary's claim that the archive was used only in connection with civil disturbance planning was similarly misleading. According to former CIAD employees, one of the principal uses of this file—if not the main reason for its existence—has been to satisfy the curiosity of the Pentagon's brass. A not unusual assignment carried out by one domestic intelligence expert was to write an unclassified report on SDS for a general to send to his daughter at an exclusive Eastern women's college.

In addition to these "plausible denials," Beal also admitted that CIAD had compiled "an identification list . . . on individuals and organizations associated with civil disturbances." "This list," he contended, "was last updated in late 1969 [true] and is available to a limited number of Department of the Army organizations with civil disturbance responsibilities [false]." According to persons who helped compile it, the Compendium went out to over 150 Army intelligence and troop units, plus the FBI, the Justice Department, Naval and Air Force Intelligence, the CIA, and U.S. embassies in West Germany and Canada.

More important, Beal conceded that "the lists are now out of date, are not considered necessary. . ., [and] are being . . . destroyed . . . ." In addition he promised that the Army would: 1) henceforth limit its curiosity to "incidents where there is a high potential for violence or disorder growing beyond the capability of state and local police and the National Guard to control;" and 2) destroy all existing *computerized* data banks on civilian politics.

No new computerized data banks, he said, would be established without the approval of both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff after "consultations with concerned committees of Congress."

The concessions were substantial. To Congressman Gallagher, they were sufficient. "In view of the Army's commendable action in reversing its former policy," he announced, "I see no further need for a Congressional hearing at this time."

To Senator Ervin, on the other hand, Beal's assurances were plainly inadequate. Only the press of other matters, such as preventative detention, bail reform, and the Government Employees' Privacy Bill kept him from calling his subcommittee into session for a full-scale review of all government political data systems, starting with the Army's.

The ACLU Goes to Court

While Congressmen and Senators struggled with the Army's evasions and deceptions, the civilian intelligence program was being attacked in the courts. On February 17 the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit in Federal District Court in Washington, D.C., against the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Commanding General of the Intelligence Command. The suit charged that the surveillance, data banks, and blacklists violated the Bill of Rights by reason of the chilling effect which knowledge of their existence can have upon the willingness of citizens to exercise their freedoms of speech, press, and association and their right to petition the government for redress of grievances.

The plaintiffs were 13 individuals and

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organizations whose non-violent, lawful politics had been the subject of widely distributed Army reports. The first was Arlo Tatum, executive director of the Quaker-sponsored Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors in Philadelphia. An IBM card prepared for his computer file at Fort Holabird showed only that he had once delivered a speech at the University of Oklahoma on the legal rights of conscientious objectors. Other plaintiffs included Women's Strike for Peace, Veterans for Peace, Conrad Lynn, and the Reverend Albert Cleage, Jr.

Even before filing suit, the ACLU was aware that a cover-up might be attempted at the lower, as well as higher, echelons of the Army. This suspicion was confirmed by the letter describing the activities of the 116th M.I. Group and by former intelligence agents who warned that many units would hide copies of blacklists and personality files, regardless of what their civilian superiors told them to do.

In an effort to prevent this, the ACLU asked the District Court on March 12 for a preliminary injunction ordering the Army to cease its destruction of the records and to deliver them (along with inventories, receipts, and certificates of destruction) to the court for safekeeping, pending the outcome of the suit. Then, if the plaintiffs were successful, the court would be in a position to assure complete destruction of the records.

A hearing on this request, and an opposing motion by the Army which asked that the entire suit be thrown out for failure to show that the program violated anyone's constitutional rights, was convened in Washington on April 22 before U.S. District Court Judge George L. Hart, Jr.

Judge Hart, a graduate of Virginia Military Institute and a battlefield colonel during World War II, was openly hostile to the ACLU's contentions. He began the proceedings with an announcement that he would not hear testimony.

In effect, this announcement meant that Hart had prejudged the ACLU's claims. Few, if any, judges would consider issuing an injunction against the government on the basis of affidavits (written statements by persons not present to testify). To do so, of course, would deny the government the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against it and would be regarded quite properly as an abuse of judicial discretion.

Hart's reasons became clearer as the hearing progressed. For example, when Frank Askin, the ACLU's chief counsel at the hearing, argued that it would be all right for members of Army intelligence to follow accounts of protest politics in the newspapers, but that they should not be permitted to maintain computerized files on the political activities of specific individuals, the judge scoffed: "It's all right if they remember it, but they can't take note of it . . . . Isn't that ridiculous?"

Nor could he understand why citizens should fear the military's surveillance any more than they should fear reporting of political activities by the news services. "Newspapers don't have guns and don't have jails," Askin responded. ". . . nobody is afraid that one of these days the newsmen are all going to sweep into town and come to arrest the troublemakers."

But the judge was unimpressed: "There is no threat that the Army is going to come in and arrest you . . . ." "If it does," he added: "We still sit here with the writ of habeas corpus."

"But, your Honor, then why are they keeping these lists of people, that's the issue at stake . . . . They have no need for this . . . ."

"It may help them know what persons are likely to cause trouble [in civil disturbances] and thereby keep an eye on them," Hart replied, apparently forgetting that the Army had agreed to withdraw the lists precisely because they were not needed for that, or any other, purpose.

The ACLU's other contentions—that the surveillance had exceeded the Army's civil disturbance responsibilities,

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that riot control troops do not need blacklists to enforce curfews or clear streets, that the CONUS intelligence operations encroached upon the authority of civilian law enforcement agencies—were also rejected. Even Askin's offer to present a former intelligence agent who had infiltrated a coalition of church groups was brushed aside with the question: "Did they have a sign saying 'No Military Personnel Are Admitted'?"

"What . . . the plaintiffs are complaining of here," Hart decided, "is that the Army is keeping the type of information that is available to the news media in this country and which is in the morgues of the newspapers . . . and magazines . . . . They show no unconstitutional action on the part of the Army; they show no threat to their rights." Accordingly, he refused to confiscate the records. Instead, he dismissed the suit.*

The likelihood that the CONUS intelligence program will be cut back soon is low. The ACLU has asked the Court of Appeals for a prompt hearing and reversal, but that court has yet to act. With summer here, chances of a hearing before fall are dim.

Chances are better that Judge Hart's decision will be overturned on appeal, but even that depends on which members of the relatively liberal Court of Appeals are assigned to review it. The panel could turn out to be as unsympathetic as Judge Hart, in which case the plaintiffs would have to take their appeal to the Supreme Court and suffer still more delays.

Thus, it will be many months at best before the witnesses testify, and perhaps years before a final judgment is rendered. Meanwhile, as the delays multiply and Army security restrictions tighten, the ACLU will find it increasingly difficult to keep its evidence up-to-date.

Odds for Congressional hearings are also poor. Representative Gallagher appears to have left the field, while Senator Ervin and his subcommittee staff are swamped by work on other matters. And although many members of Congress have expressed their personal concern about the surveillance, no other Congressional committees have taken up the fight.

Inside the executive branch, prospects are even worse. The Army's civilian leaders have said nothing since Beal's letters of March 20, while Pentagon press officers continue to evade inquiries with the excuse that to answer them would prejudice the ACLU lawsuit.* Moreover, the Justice Department has reasons of its own to put up a stiff legal battle to keep the Army contributing to the expanded surveillance of dissenters ordered by President Nixon. Were the court to end

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* At a press conference following the hearing, the ACLU's attorneys introduced several witnesses whose testimony Judge Hart refused to hear. One was Oliver Peirce, 25, a former agent assigned to the 5th Military Intelligence Detachment at Fort Carson, Colorado, during the summer and fall of 1969.

One of Peirce's assignments was to infiltrate a group called the Young Adults Project (YAP), which was established by a coalition of local church groups, the Young Democrats, and a ski club to operate a recreation center for emotionally disturbed young people. Although the project was entirely non-political, Peirce said, he and a soldier-informant were directed to make detailed reports on its meetings because one of the group's founders had attended anti-war demonstrations outside the fort and had once been a member of SDS.

In addition to watching YAP, the 5th MID also sent an informant to the 1968 SDS National Convention in Boulder, Colorado, assigned five undercover agents to monitor an anti-war vigil in the chapel of Colorado State College, maintained two full-time infiltrators within the local peace movement, and sent others to observe meetings of the Colorado Springs poverty board.

Operations such as these, Peirce said, were carried out even though they often duplicated political surveillances conducted by the FBI, state and local police, and the Colorado Springs office of the 113th Military Intelligence Group (part of the Army Intelligence Command).

* The rules against official comment on pending lawsuits, of course, were designed to protect criminal defendants from prejudicial pre-trial publicity. They do not exist to immunize the government from press inquiries when its officials are accused in civil court of exceeding their authority.

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all military domestic intelligence operations, the FBI would have to run the civil disturbance early warning system—a politically risky and tedious task which it does not want—and the FBI and the Secret Service would have to find new alternatives to what has been a free source of supplementary manpower.* In addition, the Justice Department would be deprived of the Army's political wire service, upon which it depends to feed its political computer and to produce, each week, a four-volume guide to coming events on the political circuit.

No matter how discouraging the prospects for reform may seem, however, efforts to curb the CONUS intelligence program must go on. The initiative remains with Congress—particularly with those committees of Congress which have jurisdiction to hold hearings.**

Without the threat of hearings, the Army's civilian leaders are not likely to end their evasions and deceptions, admit the full scope of the program, or reconsider its needs or consequences. They are the crisis managers of their bureaucracy. Threats, not suggestions, determine their agenda.

But while hearings may command their attention, only skillful questioning can move them towards reform. Once the full scope of the program is established, the Army's officials must be pressed to concede what in effect they acknowledged by their promises—that blacklists and dossiers do not contribute to the prediction or control of riots. Having conceded that, they will be hard put to justify the continued pursuit of personality and organizational data in light of its cost, its effect on the willingness of people to participate in politics, and the mischief that could result were the records to fall into the hands of blackmailers, demagogues, or security clearance adjudicators.

To question the Army's needs, however, is not enough. The hearings should also define the Army's authority to monitor civilian politics in light of such principles as civilian control of the military, state and civilian primacy in law enforcement, compartmentalization and decentralization of intelligence duties, and obedience to the constitutional scheme of separate branches of government sharing policy-making powers.

Finally, whether or not the hearings produce legislation, they should attempt to establish a consensus on what the lines between permissible and impermissible conduct for Army intelligence should be.

This will be the hardest task of all. There is no question that the Army must know about incidents and activities which bear upon the need for federal riot troops and the manner in which they may best be deployed. Similarly, there is no question that it does not need to know anything about the beliefs and actions of individuals and groups that pose no threat to military security or public order. Nor is there any reason to believe that Army agents must conduct undercover operations in order to calculate the size, location, and kind of riot troops may be called upon to quell.

The difficulty will come in determining 1) the extent to which military intelligence units in the field should be permitted to watch controversial politi-

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* During the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, for example, Army agents posed as TV camera crews, a naval intelligence agent tape-recorded speeches in Grant Park, and two plainclothesmen from the staff of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence occupied assigned seats within the convention hall. All of this assistance—and more—was given despite the Counterintelligence Analysis Division's correct prediction that federal troops would not be needed.

**Besides Senator Ervin's Constitutional Rights Subcommittee (of the Judiciary Committee), these include Senator Edward M. Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures (also of the Judiciary Committee), Senator John Stennis's Armed Services Committee, Senator Abraham Ribicoff's Committee on Executive Reorganization (of the Committee on Government Operations), and Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier's Subcommittee No. 3 (of the House Judiciary Committee).

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cal figures on the theory that "agitators" cause riots, and 2) the extent to which the Army, through CIAD or similar units, should be expected to analyze the political and social aspects of civil disturbances. There are strong reasons for leaving both of these functions up to civilian authorities. On the other hand, the domestic intelligence section of CIAD has a fairly good record for common sense and has more than once persuaded hard-nosed generals that demonstrators and rioters are not "the enemy," "insurgents," or part of "the Communist conspiracy."

Wherever the lines around the Army spy program are finally drawn, however, action on them should begin promptly. Incredible though it may seem, the Army has already assembled the apparatus of a police state. That apparatus must be disassembled before it falls into the hands of those who would deliberately or inadvertently misuse it. ▪

THE CONUS INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM TODAY

From what various Army spokesmen have said publicly and privately, and from the observations of sources who cannot be identified, it is possible to assemble a description of the CONUS intelligence program today.

1) The blanket surveillance of civilian political activity by the Army, cut back in January, has resumed.

2) This surveillance is a part-time activity for more than 1,000 agents of the Army Intelligence Command, who work out of some 300 offices from coast to coast, and for hundreds of agents and informants associated with troop units and installations of the Continental Army Command.

3) Sources of CONUS intelligence continue to include local and state police, the FBI, newspapers, and Army undercover operations. While most direct surveillances of lawful politics were to have ceased in January, Army plainclothesmen have been spotted recently on the Milwaukee and Madison campuses of the University of Wisconsin and at the University of Oklahoma.

4) Non-computerized regional data banks on dissenters remain at most field, region, and headquarters offices of the Army Intelligence Command and within the G-2 (intelligence) offices of many troop units and installations of the Continental Army Command.

5) One computerized data bank may continue to exist at Continental Army Command headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

6) The Army has said that it intends to keep domestic political information in its microfilm archive at the Counterintelligence Analysis Division. It has given no assurances that these records will be purged of information about persons or groups posing no threat to the armed forces or to public order.

7) Both the Intelligence Command's "identification list" and CIAD's "Compendium" have been ordered destroyed. Chances are excellent, however, that copies of both remain in circulation, along with another blacklist published by the Alabama state police and distributed by the Intelligence Command to the headquarters and region offices of each M.I. Group.

8) It is also likely that copies of the magnetic tapes which made up the memory core of the Fort Holabird computer have been hidden away or transferred to other governmental agencies.

9) The Army's intelligence reports continue to go to the FBI and to the Justice Department's interdivisional intelligence unit, where they are stored in a computer larger than the one abandoned at Fort Holabird.

10) The Army's domestic intelligence operations appear to have been cut back because the locus of civil disturbance decision-making has shifted from the Pentagon to the Justice Department. In fact, however, the Army's operations have not decreased; only the spotlight has shifted.

11) Meanwhile, new security measures make public scrutiny of the Intelligence Command more difficult. Aspects of its domestic intelligence effort have been classified (although they can hardly be of interest to foreign spies), the job of collecting political information has been reassigned to career agents wherever possible, and all agents have been threatened with prosecution if they talk.

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Memo of the Month

The Population Council

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Females in PC (Park Avenue only)
(See Below)

FROM: ECM

SUBJECT: Contraception

Do you recall in Mary McCarthy's book The Group the scene where one of the girls obtains her first diaphragm, then agonizes over it while she sits on a park bench?

We'd like to collect anecdotes relating to contraception, and I can't imagine a better source than our own office. Send in your tidbits (signed or anonymous, as you will) about getting or using contraceptives. Have you ever found their use embarrassing? annoying? amusing? Comb your memory for a "bit" for our files, won't you?

Distribution:

AB	JG	MMINTZ	LK
LB	JB	DT	MHK
MC	LB	PG	SS
MKuchnia	RB	AS	CMc
LK	SS	MP	RL
EMc	EK	JQV	MS
MKimble	BF	BW	PE
HJ	EP	NW	
SZ	MP	ER	
KC	TB		

PLEASE CROSS YOUR NAME OFF THE LIST AFTER YOU HAVE SEEN THE MEMO.

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Renewal in New York: The State Tries Its Hand



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by Samuel Kaplan

With our slum clearance program in Southeast Asia diverting billions from domestic needs, most urban development officials, consultants, and academics have an excellent excuse to do what they have always done best about the housing crisis—talk about it. And talk they do, at weekly, monthly, seasonal, annual, and perennial workshops, clinics, conferences, and seminars, whose fees are reasonable and within the limits of government expense account or allowable project development costs, or tax deductible; with courtesy cocktails and boxlunch tours by way of a superhighway (probably built at the expense of low-income housing) to the nearest new town, urban renewal project (a downtown mall),or small attractive park where "environment" has been added to the concerns; with afternoons optional for sight-seeing, hustling contracts and grants, or golf; with sign-ups taken for the popular group tours of industrialized housing projects in eastern Europe—little interest having been shown by officials in possible tours of Harlem, Watts, or Detroit.



The agendas also are predictable: fawning introductory remarks by the local mayor, governor, or dean of an urban studies diploma mill that fronts for a "non-profit" consortium of urbanologists who never know where their next grant or research contract is coming from; work sessions chaired by consultants or company representatives flaunting their expertise or pushing their product; a major after-dinner speech by a high-ranking official of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, rich in rhetoric about industry's new role, the new federalism, and local initiative, but always somehow avoiding specifics concerning time schedules and dollar commitments by the Administration. The sessions are as real as the sketches of fantasy projects that the participants lug along and stand and smile next to for the news photographer in the lobby of the conference hotel.

Samuel Kaplan is Director of Development at the New York City Educational Construction Fund.

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Recently, a new item has been added to the agenda to revive lagging interests and give government, industry, and academic freeloaders a new excuse for a three-day jaunt away from their paper dreams of rebuilding America. The new item is a speech or a presentation or a discussion group usually entitled "The Responsibility of States," or some variation thereon, the subject consisting of what the states can do about the urban crisis. For with the federal government certainly not doing anything about the crisis in terms of dollars, many states are finally putting their toes into the leaking cauldrons that are our cities, though, it should be added, under the growing pressure of reapportioned legislatures, recurring riots, and screaming headlines. Twenty-six states now have cabinet-level departments of community or urban affairs and at least 13 states have set up housing finance agencies. Other states are considering establishing similar agencies, though it has become obvious that despite the reams of rhetoric, most of the new departments are floundering for lack of power, money, and initiative.

The consensus among conferees at the continuing cocktail parties is that new ways must be found to halt the blight engulfing our cities and seeping into the suburbs. And with that statement, someone inevitably raises a toast to the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC). To be sure, the expression of hope usually follows a glowing presentation by a representative of the UDC, which has become within the last year a consistent feature of the panels discussing states' responsibilities. But the UDC deserves the attention and certainly the toast, for in fact it is to date the most advanced agency created to tackle the awesome problems of urban development.

The UDC is a public benefit corporation, created to combine "the energies of private enterprise with a variety of public programs, to help renew New York State's cities and towns and to plan and develop the orderly growth of urban areas." The language of its mandate is the typical liturgy, but its arsenal of powers to carry out its broad and vague purpose is not typical. And it is these powers that have excited renewal administrators, planners, and "housers" across the country. The UDC can condemn property; plan residential, industrial, commercial, educational, recreational, and cultural facilities, including combinations for new towns or new cities; build them, if no one else will; own them and lease or manage them; receive tax exemptions, and—a big and—if need be, override local zoning and building codes, which many feel are the biggest blocks to meeting the housing crisis. In addition, the UDC has received a $5 million state appropriation to help it get started, and $88 million more to cover planning and project costs prior to permanent financing—vital "seed money" to bridge the gap from planning rhetoric to building realities. Finally, UDC is authorized by law to issue notes and bonds up to $1 billion, a figure which at last puts urban renewal in the nine zero league where it belongs. Of course it is not enough, but as every politician, bureaucrat, and budget officer knows it can only go higher. The UDC can also draw on the billion dollar-plus mortgage capacity of the New York State Housing Finance Agency. The UDC has two subsidiary sister agencies, the Corporation for Urban Development and Research, which can plan and initiate demonstration projects, and the Urban Development Guarantee Fund, which gets around some state charter problems in financing project loans.

The UDC package is sweeping and one that "no state legislature in its right mind would ever approve," according to a New York legislator who voted for it. Indeed, hardly anyone thought the Legislature *would* approve the UDC proposal when it was announced on February 27, 1968, by Governor Rockefeller.

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After all, local zoning rights are generally held as sacred as God and the DAR. It was with an obvious eye on Washington —remember, this was early 1968—that Rockefeller had declared the necessity of taking "extreme measures" if the cities of the state, and the nation, were to be saved.

The package made excellent headlines for the Governor, reinforcing his national image as a "doer," but it languished in Albany, collecting derisive remarks and dust. Mayor Lindsay denounced it as an "encroachment of home rule rights" that "cannot be tolerated" and offered his own plan. Other mayors and local officials were even less kind. But as quick as the crack of a rifle, the situation changed. On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis. Governor Rockefeller sent a special message to the Legislature a few days later, urging passage of the urban development package as a tribute and a memorial to the slain civil rights leader, and then flew to Atlanta to attend the funeral. During the afternoon of April 9, the day of the funeral, the proposal passed the Senate, but in the Assembly conservative upstate Republicans joined liberal New York City Democrats to defeat the package 85 to 48. After the funeral the Governor started making telephone calls, urging, cajoling, and threatening legislators to reconsider the vote. Patronage and pet bills were dangled before Assemblymen in a dazzling display of political power, and within seven hours 40 votes were turned. The package went back before the Assembly at 11:30 that night and was approved 86 to 45. The Governor signed the proposal into law the following day, and the most potent government-created apparatus for making some impact on urban development problems was in business in New York state.

Rockefeller squashed rumors that the UDC was just a gimmick in his drive for the Republican Presidential nomination by appointing Edward J. Logue as president and chief executive officer of the new agency. Logue, an urban renewal administrator with a reputation for actual accomplishment rare among that paper-pushing breed, is a man of action —for better or worse, depending on the perspective. He spent 15 well-publicized years bulldozing and rebuilding large sections of New Haven and Boston while giving blunt advice on urban redemption to any group that would listen. With the UDC embodying many of his recommendations, Logue was not expected to sit still and build paper cities.

More than two dozen states have expressed interest in setting up a development corporation similar to the UDC, including California, Illinois, and New Jersey, and have requested information from the agency's midtown Manhattan offices. But so far they are still watching. "There are two ways another state may get a package similar to the UDC passed," a New York urbanist observed. "The first way is for the state to have a strong governor, who is committed to an action program in urban development and whose party controls the Legislature, introduce the package—and then wait for a prominent assassination to occur just when the Legislature is about to adjourn. The second way is for the UDC to be such an overwhelming success that every state would want to duplicate it. Both are highly improbable, but I have not given up on the second way—not yet."

Despite its powers, potential, publicity, and praise, UDC after two years in existence has some serious internal and external difficulties. These include a dependence on federal subsidy programs; the lack of these subsidies; the failure of state and federal bodies to keep pace with UDC's promised performance schedules, aggravated in part by the arrogance and inexperience of some UDC staff; vacillating, frightened, and inept local communities; and inflation, with its soaring construction costs and high cost of money. All are testing the credibilitiy of the corporation. It is to Logue's credit that in the face of these problems UDC is churning away, announcing more projects, promising delivery, setting con-

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struction dates, putting out press releases, cheering desperate mayors and citizens' groups whose communities are on the verge of collapse—in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. If the agency fails, and there is that possibility, it will do so in a grand style with an impressive inventory of plans and renderings.

Spreading the $88 million appropriation like Johnny Appleseed himself, Logue has launched more than 50 studies across the state. Thirty-four of the studies already have been translated into agreements with 12 cities to proceed on projects totaling almost $1 billion in construction. Approximately 27,000 housing units are scheduled, including an impressive scheme for 2,400 units on the Lake Erie waterfront of Buffalo, designed by architect Paul Rudolph, and 5,000 units on New York City's Welfare Island, now a drab 147-acre strip of antiquated hospitals and abandoned buildings with spectacular views of Manhattan and only five minutes from midtown. The Welfare Island scheme, laid out by architects Philip Johnson and John Burgee, also calls for community and commercial facilities, all in a park setting that if built according to plans should be one of the most attractive developments in the world. The UDC has promised New York City to start construction by the end of 1971 and finish in eight years. Other project agreements also state construction dates—10,000 units are scheduled for groundbreaking this year—which, given the current pattern of financing and construction delays, must be considered a remarkable act of faith.

According to UDC, its income-range formula for almost all of its housing is 70 per cent middle-income, 20 per cent low-income, and 10 per cent elderly. However, UDC housing must be self-supporting. The agency does not have its own funds for housing subsidies, which in these days of soaring construction costs and community rejection of public housing have become the only means of building new shelter for low- and moderate-income families. The UDC, therefore, must stand in line for the thimbleful of federal and state subsidies available. Particularly critical is the availability of funds under the FHA's Section 236 (of the 1968 Housing Act) mortgage-interest-subsidy program, which can reduce the rent of a unit developed under New York's middle-income housing program from an average $200 a month for a four-room apartment to $120 a month. The current federal 236 appropriation is $75 million, which, even should HUD untie its red tape, would not take care of New York's total needs, not to mention 49 other states. Federal officials have praised the UDC as an excellent vehicle to "restore to the states their proper rights and roles" under the banner of Nixon's New Federalism. But in buckpassing to the states the responsibility to save our cities, the present Administration has failed to pass the bucks. There is no question that if more federal housing subsidies are not forthcoming UDC will fail its charge to produce housing for low-income New Yorkers.

The UDC lacks another vital form of subsidy, land "writedown" funds, which is the essence of any urban renewal. This means that the UDC cannot, as can an urban renewal agency, assemble land, then sell or lease it for less than the cost of assemblage, so the buyer or lessee can reduce the cost of development accordingly. Again, UDC has to be self-supporting. As a result, it often has to work through the local renewal agency in developing inner-city sites, no easy task considering the political hacks and third-grade planners usually found in agencies in small cities. In addition, most of the urban renewal projects thrown to the UDC by cities are done so out of desperation. They are the ones at the bottom of the barrel, or the targets of bitter community battles that have left the plans in shreds while the land collects garbage. "We got some dogs," a UDC planner admitted.

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Though newspapers have labeled the UDC a "super-renewal agency," the lack of land writedown money actually reduces the role of UDC in cities to that of a developer, though—with its bushelful of planning money to seed projects, staff to help inept local agencies process papers through the federal bureaucracy, the resources to build the projects, own them, and manage them, and the option to ignore local building or zoning codes—a developer of a rather rare species, a super-developer, in fact. And here lies an internal problem. Real estate developers are a hungry breed, always looking for a deal while balancing a dozen projects in the air, talking into two phones as a chorus of accountants, lawyers, and contractors scream in the background. Time is money, limiting the vocabulary of most developers to a few expletives not found in planning manuals and a quick "yes" or "no." Unfortunately, the vocabulary of most of the UDC staff is not so limited, nor do they seem as hungry. With some exceptions, they are bureaucrats, programmed by years of numbing research projects in urban studies centers or large legal firms, followed by stints of memo- and application-writing as city planners, organization men, or urban renewal administrators. They can spin wheels, but have a hard time putting anything into gear. Though Logue has kept UDC relatively small—the staff numbers 220—there is a perceptible hardening of the bureaucratic arteries. According to architects, builders, and lawyers who have dealt with the UDC, there are few members of the UDC staff with any real sympathy or understanding of the private development field. "It's hard getting a straight answer out of anybody under Logue," commented a builder.

As an example, one developer tells how the UDC encouraged him to find a parcel of land in a county 90 miles from New York City to put up 300 units of moderate-income housing for blue collar workers. An industry vital to the local economy was hesitating to expand because of its inability to attract workers, who complained of the lack of housing —a typical suburban and exurban problem. The developer found a parcel, took out an option, and got tentative approval for a needed zoning change from the county, which was anxious for the industry to expand. When he brought the package back to the UDC official to whom he had first talked, he was told he would know in a month whether the UDC would proceed. Four months, a renewed option, and many inquiries later, the developer was told by a UDC secretary that his application was turned down. A month after that, the developer found out that UDC had turned down the application because an internal market study had revealed that 300 other units were "planned" in the area; UDC apparently did not know that they had been "planned" for eight years and nothing had ever happened (nor has it since). Having spent a few thousand dollars on options and sketch plans, the developer dropped his option in disgust, only to be called still another month later by the UDC official, who said his office needed some projects that could "move," asked that the package be put together again, and promised an answer —in a month. The developer declined in no uncertain terms. "Who needs the aggravation," he complained. "They are as bad as the FHA—worse, because they fool you with their enthusiasm. They are playing planning games—with my money and time."

The example is a minor one, but larger developers involved in major UDC projects tell of similar confusion. Not wanting to harm their relationships with the agency, the developers asked that these examples of delay and misdirection not be used. They add, correctly, that UDC is only two years old and is still working out its operational problems. But one wonders if the bright young men shaped in the urban renewal mold can shake loose and begin to operate with the flexibility allowed under the liberal UDC legislation. One problem

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may be Logue, who runs a tight ship and likes to involve himself in every decision. This worked in New Haven and Boston, where Logue was a hard-driving task master putting in 14 hours a day. But New York state is 32 times as large as Boston and the UDC program happily broader than urban renewal, and Logue may have to delegate more authority than he has in the past.

Though many UDC staffers are confident to the point of arrogance when dealing with outsiders, they are a pretty up-tight group inside Logue's lair. "Let's face it, no one does anything of consequence without the clear approval of Him," said an ex-staffer, who finally got tired of waiting around for Logue's ear. "No one else would give me a straight answer. They were afraid to or did not know what was going on and just tried to bluff it." Sensitive to the charge of bureaucratization, Logue keeps a copy of Parkinson's Law in his office. Someone suggested he should be given a copy of Robert Townsend's *Up the Organization.* The suggestion irked Logue, who contends that he is "wildly uncomfortable with formal staff structures" and is consciously delegating more authority as the UDC program grows. As for UDC's role as a developer, Logue says he'd rather have UDC be what can best be described as a "packager in the public interest." He sees UDC's limiting its role to developing plans, arranging financing, and then selling the "package" to a developer, whom it will oversee to insure that the package is carried out as agreed. "The indications we have," says Logue, "are that private equity and development capital will be available if we perform our catalytic role properly."

However, some developers don't think UDC is handling even that role the right way. "The packages look nice," commented a representative of one of the nation's biggest builders, who is being courted by UDC, "but after a long, hard look at the details it was obvious to us that the scheme would have to be completely reworked by our own people if it were ever to be built." Other developers have made similar complaints, as have plan reviewers for the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, which will have to put up the permanent financing for most of the UDC residential projects. "The problem is simply inexperience," explained a builder. "But if the UDC wants to keep its schedules and have some groundbreakings, especially with Rockefeller running for re-election this year, its consultants and staff are going to have to come down from out of the clouds."

What is accentuating the conflict, making developers irritable and UDC nervous and defensive, is inflation, which, according to the latest figures, is adding 1.5 per cent a month (18 per cent a year) to construction costs. UDC estimates that its residential construction cost in New York City is now $37,000 a unit—pushing $40,000—making money for subsidies a must if UDC is to keep its promise to provide New York with low- and moderate-income housing. Inflation also has lit a rocket under interest rates and has made bank loans, especially for construction, virtually non-existent. If the inflation gets worse, it may totally abort UDC's building program, just as it may totally undermine the economy.

Nevertheless, UDC stumbles forward, breathing some life into New York's urban renewal efforts, providing a needed boost to cautious developers, do-gooders, and municipalities that want to sponsor housing, and giving hope through its new town program that rational, sensitive growth can co-exist with capitalism in the countryside. There is no question that Logue's leadership is arbitrary and heavy-handed, but there also is little question that he has taken a new and imperfect tool and given it direction and force. The UDC certainly needs all the push that can be mustered to get it through its formative years, and, hopefully, to serve as a prototype for other states watching cautiously as their cities crumble and their countryside is cut up. ■

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THE CULTURE OF BUREAUCRACY

DIA: Intelligence to Please

by Patrick J. McGarvey

Among a multitude of examples of the Pentagon's proclivity for laboring mountainously and bringing forth mice, an instructive one is the Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA is responsible for providing the Secretary of Defense, and ultimately the President, with up-to-date facts about military matters of all kinds and with dispassionate assessments of what those facts portend. Presumably, it is because statesmen possess this crucial secret information that they can resolve so much more wisely than an uninformed man in the street such issues as, say, whether or not to send American soldiers into Cambodia. However, the assiduous cultivation by the diplomatic and military establishment of the presumption that it is on the basis of "having all the facts" that a President acts does not mean that it has much basis in reality. Leaving aside the fascinating question of the extent to which any secret intelligence, as compared with political calculation or predeliction or dogma, influences decisions, the secret intelligence dispensed by DIA is all too often of a quality that makes it more of a hindrance than a help to rational decision-making.

Two kinds of defects are pervasive in DIA—an outfit commonly referred to in the intelligence community as "the taxi squad" or "the country club" or "the old people's home." One, probably the less injurious of the two because it is so common a Washington phenomenon that most officials are bound to suspect it and try to compensate for it, is the tendency of any operating agency's evaluation arm to justify the agency's oper-

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ations. Thus, DIA's reports—which to some extent are necessarily guesses—about, for example, the amount of damage bombing the Ho Chi Minh trail inflicts and how much that damage limits Hanoi's capability to fight, are almost certain to be the highest possible guesses, not so much through slovenliness or mendacity as in accordance with natural bureaucratic law. Or, to cite another example, in determining whether or not the F-105 that the Chinese shot down in May, 1966, had really strayed into Chinese air space as the Chinese claimed, there were two basic sources of data: radar plots and the accounts of the pilots of the other planes in the mission. The radar plots, which had an impressive record of previous accuracy and no personal ax to grind, showed that the flight had flown well into Chinese territory. The returned pilots, who if they were human had some inclination to exonerate themselves, said the flight had done no such thing. DIA resolved this conflict in accordance with the natural law: it took the word of the pilots.

This kind of self-justification, which is by no means an exclusively military vice, may be absurd; but a good deal of the time its sheer blatancy insures that it won't be taken very seriously. Much harder to detect and guard against are the workings of DIA's policy of compromise and of blandness, of pleasing everybody and therefore of informing or edifying nobody. For example, during the early days of the bombing of North Vietnam, the Army, which was pushing for a big buildup of ground forces, wanted to show that North Vietnamese forces were pouring into the South at unprecedented rates. However, the Air

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Force's interest was to show that very few northern troops were getting through its barrage. In theory DIA was set up to choose among such conflicting claims; in practice it generally refuses to admit that a conflict exists and comes up with something like "Enemy infiltration continued at a rate higher than last month. However, the cumulative effect of U.S. bombing has seriously degraded his ability to mount a large-scale offensive"—never mind whether mounting a large-scale offensive was what the enemy had in mind. It is hard to imagine how such an evaluation could help produce a reasoned bombing policy or, indeed, anything but an intellectual miasma.

Perhaps one reason DIA is so proficient at compromise is that it is a product of compromise itself. It was formed in October, 1961, by former Secretary of Defense McNamara in the hope that he would receive intelligence appraisals without service bias and to eliminate some of the duplication of intelligence activities in the Department of Defense (DOD). Pitched battles took place as the agency was formed. The Army was totally against it. It fought every suggestion, preferring to hang onto the responsibility of producing its own intelligence. The Navy, too, was against the formation of DIA but fought less vehemently. The Air Force seized the ball and ran with it. As a result most of the top management jobs at the beginning went to blue suiters. This brawling forced a crucial compromise between McNamara and the service intelligence staffs. To quiet the opposition McNamara finally allowed the DIA to be placed under the supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In short, it was agreed that DIA would serve the civilians through the military rather than report to the Secretary through a (civilian) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

By charter, then, the DIA serves two masters—the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. What this entails with respect to the JCS is providing intelligence background and assessments for just about every decision paper that is put out by the chiefs, briefing the JCS daily on overnight developments and keeping them abreast whenever necessary of longer-range developments worldwide, and working closely with every component of the Joint Staff, the working arm of the JCS. If, for example, the J-5 Plans Staff is drafting a contingency planning paper on Africa, DIA must provide as much detail as is necessary, which could include data on coast and landing beaches, urban maps that show key installations, political, sociological, and economic studies of the countries involved, and, of course, in-depth assessments of the country's military capabilities. In other areas, such as science and technology, DIA must keep the JCS informed on such technical breakthroughs as are achieved by any and all potential enemies around the world. The discovery of a new radar site in the Soviet Union, for example, can generate more paper in the Pentagon than the rational mind can comprehend. If the J-3 Operations Staff wants to plan a bombing campaign, the DIA must come up with suitable lists of targets, pinpointing them on maps and assessing the likely effect the destruction of the targets would have on the target country—a service that reached new heights of absurdity, which will be touched on later, during the bombing of North Vietnam.

The responsibilities the DIA has to the Secretary of Defense are not so easy to define because they depend on the Secretary's attitude. McNamara was a demanding taskmaster. To date, Melvin Laird has chosen not to be one. Several functions, however, persist under Laird. Public affairs people in the Secretary's office relay a lot of foul balls DIA's way. A hot flyer will come winging down with a photocopy of a press article stating, for example, that the Soviets are flying MIGs over Egypt. DIA will be asked to provide, by noon, "a complete assessment of the details. How do they stack up with classified holdings? How did they get this information (as if DIA

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knew)? Give me a classified reply and an unclassified reply." At one time the Secretary's staff demanded and got detailed information on all matters that had intelligence relevance. This, of course, put DIA squarely in the middle of controversies between the Secretary's staff and the JCS. For example, it had to provide the JCS with enemy infiltration data that would support a request for more troops for Vietnam, and, on the other hand, it had to provide the Secretary's staff with an assessment of Vietnamese troop strength, U.S. "body count" claims, and the results of the bombing of North Vietnam, all of which would be used as ammunition to shoot down the requests.

Indeed, figures are used to support any imaginable position and often they are the same figures. I was treated to a fine example of number shuffling several months ago. A knowledgeable source in DIA informed me that the personnel office was concerned about the attrition rate among the agency's college trainees and had called a conference of young men who had gone through the year-long training program to find out what was on their minds. At this session the personnel staffers disclosed that better than 60 per cent of college trainees in the past two years had quit. A confidential survey among those remaining indicated that 55 per cent were actively seeking employment elsewhere. When I published an article containing these figures, DIA quickly denied it. It stated that the figure was approximately 27 per cent, normal attrition rate in government and industry. Further digging revealed that in the "refining" of the original 60 per cent figure DIA had:

- diluted the issue by "broadening the data base" to take into account all hirings and resignations during the period, including clerks, messengers, and secretaries;
- included in the total only those who quit within 12 months of completion of training; resignations after 12 months were deemed immaterial to the question at hand;
- omitted from its new figures men who had resigned to return to school for graduate work;
- dropped from the total all men who had been drafted and failed to return to DIA after discharge;
- included in its new figures only those men who had resigned while in grades GS-7 and GS-9; higher grade resignations were not included.

Another function DIA performs for the Secretary of Defense is to prepare detailed fact sheets for his trips and interviews. DIA also keeps him informed daily of worldwide developments and provides him with estimates of likely future developments. Most important to the Secretary, DIA is expected to serve as arbiter among the services' divergent points of view on intelligence matters. It has presumably been given the clout to do this since its director wears three stars and thus outranks the two-star chiefs of the service intelligence branches.

Tell Me What I'd Love to Hear

Indeed, DIA's performance with respect to Vietnam should have proved the futility of a joint service approach to intelligence, and in fact Secretaries McNamara and Clifford finally stopped paying any attention to DIA and went to the CIA for answers. From 1964-65, when U.S. involvement in Vietnam began to be considerable, until late 1966 or early 1967, the generals in Saigon worked to build up U.S. troop strength. Therefore, they wanted every bit of evidence brought to the fore that could show that infiltration was increasing. DIA obliged and also emphasized in all reports the enemy's capability to recruit forces from the South Vietnamese population. In 1967 a second period began. The high priests of Saigon decided that we were "winning." Then the paramount interest became to show the enemy's reduced capability to recruit and a slowdown in infiltration due to our bombing. The tune and emphasis of reports from the field changed radically,

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and so did those put out by DIA.

It should not be concluded that anyone suppressed evidence. No one did. The military in Saigon sent all the facts back to Washington eventually. During the buildup period, infiltration data and recruitment data came in via General Westmoreland's daily cablegram. Data from field contact with enemy units came amid the more mundane cables or by courier up to five weeks later. Cables from Westmoreland, of course, were given higher priority in Washington. When we started "winning," detailed reports highlighting "body counts" and statistics on how many villages were pacified were cabled with Westmoreland's signature; recruitment studies were pouched or cabled with the reports on the fluctuating price of rice. It was all a matter of emphasis.

During all this time DIA was thoroughly enmeshed in the numbers game. It paid little or no attention to what Hanoi was saying on the radio, discounting it as propaganda. It made little effort to perceive the enemy's view of the war. It made little effort to reason out what the enemy's strategy was, why he believed he was winning, what he was saying publicly about how he was going to fight the war, or how the bombing was affecting his morale. It was too busy keeping up with the flow of numbers from Saigon.

As the air campaign crept northward, the Operations people on the Joint Staff wanted bigger and better targets. They didn't ask the intelligence people what was worth hitting or what a rational plan of attack might be. On the contrary, they demanded targets that a certain weapons system could attack. They had a TV-guided missile, and they wanted to use it. "Pick out a building for us to hit," they'd say. DIA could have told the JCS this was the wrong approach, but it played the game. It sent photo-interpreters scurrying to their scanners to find, say, a two- or three-story building in an area open to U.S. raids. If they saw no signs of military activity around the building they would dub it a "possible military storage area," a description that gave J-3 the right to go hunting.

The Operations staff's biggest hangup was over the prohibition on bombing the port of Haiphong. It refused to accept the judgment of the CIA that bombing the port wouldn't stop the flow of goods into North Vietnam. It refused to believe that the North Vietnamese man-packed arms across the Chinese border and imported little by sea. DIA, bowing to J-3's insistence, came up with a list of several hundred small, insignificant targets in and near Haiphong, listing them as crucial and suggesting that the cumulative effect of hitting all 200 or more barge and ferry landings, rail spurs, bridges, and road intersections would be the same as flattening Haiphong—again a triumph for the art of compromise and no doubt small comfort to the pilots shot down in that heavily defended area.

Well before the Tet Offensive of January, 1968, when the enemy buildup at Khe Sanh first became obvious, two DIA analysts who had been studying enemy tactics and strategy for four years sat down and wrote a paper that concluded that the enemy was planning a feint at Khe Sanh. They based this judgment on their interpretation of General Giap's fighting methods over the past two years. They outlined a likely enemy course of action designed to draw American forces to the Khe Sanh area so that the populous coastal plains would be left thinly defended and concluded that perhaps it would be unwise to react to the Khe Sanh buildup. They presented the findings of their paper at a briefing, much to the amusement of all present. They suggested that the paper be cabled to Saigon as a DIA assessment of the situation and that the JCS be given the benefit of their thoughts. This, too, caused merriment among the assembled. "How could you possibly know more than General Westmoreland?" they were asked. Their boss, an Army Colonel, finally got angry at their persistence and taped the paper to the wall beside his desk, claiming that the analysts had just stuck their professional reputations on

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the line, and adding he hoped they were wrong. The paper hung there until late in March, 1968, after the Tet Offensive, which occurred largely on the coastal plain, and after the enemy ended the siege of Khe Sanh without ever assaulting it. Then it was taken down quietly. The Colonel never mentioned the subject again. The JCS was never given a copy, and it was never cabled to Saigon.

The pressures on DIA to conform to the views of the military are hard to resist. Take a mechanism know as the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which is supposed to represent the best judgment of the intelligence community on a particular issue and is used by the President and his Cabinet in formulating policy. Everyone in the intelligence business has a chance to assert his point of view in these estimates, and it is here that DIA's role is crucial. DIA is well aware that many service judgments are biased and don't reflect reality. Its obligation, in those cases, is to assume its responsibility as arbiter among the services and establish a Defense position on the issue, and it works hard at doing just that. But strong pressures usually come in through the back door.

For one thing, there is something called the "Eyes Only" cable that is sent "back channel" and is severely restricted in dissemination. Usually no more than five people see it. I have seen "Eyes Only" cables come in from the U.S. Commanders in Honolulu and Saigon to the Director of DIA requesting that he give more than a passing consideration to the command viewpoint about this or that. The language is always moving. Such a cable is likely to start off complimenting the recipient for the fine job he is doing and then work in high-sounding phrases which evoke motherhood, apple pie, the American flag, and, of course, the uniform. It then implies that the sender would like to see a particular judgment or set of figures changed to conform to the command view. It rarely offers any evidence to support this request. It is sure to close with a veiled threat that the recipient's career is in jeopardy if he doesn't play the game and "get on the team." Many estimates have been changed or reworded because of an "Eyes Only" cable from a field commander. In one instance the Air Force Chief of Intelligence called my boss at DIA about a nearly completed estimate on U.S. bombing in Laos. He told him that he was sending a team down to change the wording of the estimate and that my boss had better remember what color his uniform was. Of course it was the same as the General's blue. The team arrived, and, over the protests of the DIA analysts, a compromise was reached.

The classic example of command influence on intelligence matters occurred just after the Tet Offensive in January, 1968. In the early weeks of February the JCS insisted that the offensive was total military defeat for the enemy— General Westmoreland told them so in his daily cables. DIA didn't agree with this interpretation, but it watered down every paper it wrote on this subject so that its position was impossible to determine. Then General Wheeler went to Saigon and came back with Westmoreland's request for 206,000 troops to "clean up" the "defeated" enemy. Suddenly it was legitimate to say that the Tet Offensive had really "set us back." Everybody on the service staffs, with DIA leading the pack, started writing gloomy estimates with unaccustomed forthrightness and clarity.

Wave-Makers Always Sink

Everyone connected with DIA is partially at fault for the agency's shortcomings. This includes the military who run it, the civilians who staff it, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the individual service staffs. As far as the military men who manage the agency are concerned, their guilt or incompetence results simply from the fact that they are uniformed men with a parent service. Imagine, if you will, what the prospect of a tour with DIA

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looks like to a military officer. He knows or soon learns that he will be thrust into a position in which, on occasion, his professional judgement will vary markedly from that of his parent service. He will be expected to defend a position that could enrage his Chief of Staff—but officers who do so more than once get known fast and are accorded an appropriate "reward" at a later date in terms of promotion and assignment. Consider also that a tour at DIA—normally two to three years—is very short when compared to a 20- to 30-year military career. And so most officers assigned to DIA go through a predictable pattern. They come on board as "hard-chargers," ready to set the world on fire. They stick to their principles through one or two scrapes. Then they become a little more circumspect, letting individual issues slide by and rationalizing that it wasn't a crunch question anyway. Finally, they resign themselves to "sweating out" their tours and playing every situation by ear. They avoid committing themselves or making decisions. They refuse to tackle the agency's long-term organizational ills because doing so would make too many waves.

The shortness of the tours of duty of the military managers of the agency (about nine-tenths of management jobs are filled by military officers) causes some long-term problems. These officers are interested largely in getting good performance out of staff while they are there, not in building up long-run staff or agency capabilities. They want to impress the General, let him know that he's running a "cracker-jack" outfit. The General, of course, is largely occupied with current problems, so his subordinates gear up to service his needs. This has resulted over the years in the reduction of DIA's long-term research capability to near zero. More than 95 per cent of the effort expended in DIA on Vietnam, for example, is on current problems. Long-term study groups have been disbanded and the staff reassigned to the current problem area. Basic intelligence for detailed studies is simply not getting done or is whipped out with a weekend's furious overtime. The managers who choose to cut the long-term staff don't worry about the ultimate effect because by the time it becomes evident they'll be off on other assignments.

Another problem is the "can do" attitude that prevails among the officer corps. It is unthinkable for an officer to tell his superior that he cannot complete a task. It is a form of heresy. Officers accept a requirement for four or six extra hours' work a day when they know their staff already puts in 12- or 14-hour days. Rarely, if ever, does anyone say no, or point out that certain jobs take time. "Yes Sir, can do!", is all that is heard. The result is an attitude among DIA staff members that is captured in their motto, "If you want it real bad, you're gonna get it real bad."

There is the age-old military problem of "time in grade"—the tradition that confers genius-like powers on the man who's been around the longest. The impact that this practice has on the efficient functioning of DIA can be illustrated by the fact that I had nine bosses within two years and that each of the first eight was unseated because someone with more time in grade came along. The game of musical chairs goes on constantly. One Army Colonel had been the Commander of the Special Forces in South Vietnam before he was assigned to DIA. He came into the Vietnam division and was contributing tremendously until another Colonel with more time in grade came along. So they transferred the Special Forces Colonel to the Soviet division and assigned the new Colonel to the Vietnam division. The new Colonel was a graduate of the Army's Foreign Area Specialist Training program in Czech affairs.

Then there is the civilian staff. It is second rate, particularly at the middle and upper levels. The military who run the place have made it that way. They have consistently shown over the years that there's no room in DIA for truly capable civilians. They have discouraged original thought, drained the civilian

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staff of initiative, and inculcated them with the "don't make waves" approach to everything. Very few civilians hold down management slots in DIA, but that doesn't mean they are without influence. Throughout the agency there are civilian deputies at most levels of command. They form an infrastructure that wields a great deal of influence in the day-to-day operation of the organization. The problem is that the ones who have survived that long in the bureaucracy are thoroughly bureaucratized. They are the ones who advise a brash Lieutenant Colonel to "soften his judgment," "temper his language," and "play the game." Their strength, in many cases, comes from their detailed familiarity with the inner workings of the complicated JCS paper mill. They know when to delay a paper, when to react quickly to one, how to kill one, how to insure that it gets through, and, most importantly, how and where to find out exactly what the General wants the paper to say. They then set out to insure that the General's wishes are translated verbatim into the final product, even if those wishes conflict with the evidence on hand or the views of knowledgeable analysts.

Finally, there are half-breed civilians at DIA—retired military officers. These men are generally capable in their areas of job experience, but two factors virtually negate their experience and job skill. The first, and most important, is the fact that they are retired and looking for an easy deal. Their fighting days are over, and they want to take it easy. They never make waves. They simply do what is asked of them. The other factor is simply that they are heavily biased in favor of the military, and they color all of their judgments with this bias. Their attitudes and actions also have a definite influence on the civilians in the agency. For one thing they are hired at the middle grades and clog up the promotion cycle for the younger men. They also have an "in" with the military managers and can frequently be seen on the fairways and greens of the Army-Navy Country Club. Somehow they are always the ones to get the trips abroad.

As far as I can see, the only way to extricate DIA from this morass is to take it altogether out of military hands. There should be an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, a civilian. The line of command within the agency should be staffed by civilians—though not those now present, who are too far down the bureaucratic path for salvation. In the think-tanks around the country, in the universities, and in other areas of government, there is a pool of very capable men who could enable DIA to meet its enormous responsibilities. With civilians in the management positions, the chances that service bias would overwhelm, distort, or avoid intelligence judgments would be considerably less. Military men can play an important role in DIA, but not in the management of the agency. In substantive areas dealing with foreign military capabilities, the expertise of U.S. infantrymen or armor specialists, for example, can be put to good use.

Any prediction for the future of DIA has to be grim. One recent glimmer of hope (now fading) came when Secretary Laird directed his assistant for administration, Robert L. Froehlke, to take a hard look at Defense intelligence activities. However, it seems that Froehlke has fallen prey to the military briefings that he was given at DIA. He has set up an office to "coordinate" all DOD intelligence activities—and if there is one thing the DOD can do without, it is another office to coordinate things. DIA probably will grow larger, less productive, and more expensive as time goes on, coordination to the contrary notwithstanding. It will probably continue to drop the ball in emergencies like the Tet Offensive. DIA will doubtless continue to supply the nation's decision-makers with evaluations that do them little good and potentially much harm. One can only hope that the decision-makers pay little attention to what DIA tells them. ■

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BOOKS:

A Pharaoh's Memoirs

A Review by Mary Perot Nichols

Public Works: A Dangerous Trade
by Robert Moses
McGraw-Hill, 952 pages, $14.50.

No doubt the admirers of Robert Moses thought this gigantic tome by one of the world's master builders would go down as *the* definitive work on the trade. There would seem to be no other commercial reason for its publication. But reading Mr. Moses's egregious collection of self-congratulatory old *Newsday* columns, letters to and from famous people, his General Motors prize-winning essay on how to fill more cities with traffic, and so on, is a little like cutting through a wall of concrete with one's nose.

Never once does self-doubt afflict this remarkable man. Always it was his critics who were out of step, not he. What is fascinating about this book, if anything, is not what it does say but what it leaves out. Nowhere does it analyze how Mr. Moses became the most powerful public servant of his time in New York City and state. And that is the really important story, the one which should be learned by all those interested in public administration—if only to keep the Moses phenomenon from happening again.

Interestingly enough, the two men who did learn most from Moses's example were Governor Nelson Rockefeller and his close associate, present Metropolitan Transportation Authority Chairman William Ronan. Ronan's jurisdiction, often referred to as the "Holy Ronan Empire," is a direct off-shoot of his studies of Moses. When he was a young college professor, Ronan wrote a bill, known as the Hult Bill, designed to cut down Moses's multitudinous powers. It was overwhelmingly defeated in the Legislature by the forces Moses was able to command. Having been thus defeated as a young man, Ronan became secretary to Governor Rockefeller and finally achieved chairmanship of the MTA with more powers than even Moses had dared to reach for. Rockefeller, of course, was to go on to great dreams of empire expressed by his outrageously expensive

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Albany Mall. The Mall is bad enough to be a Moses job, and one of the old Moses forces that has proven to be everlastingly grateful to Rockefeller is the building and construction trades unions. They will try to re-elect him governor this fall.

A glimpse into the Moses world and how he held it together was not possible until 1959, some 50 years after he began his public life. Then the cork blew and all sorts of genies came out of the bottle. It began with a headline in the *New York Post* on a piece by investigative reporters William Haddad and Joseph Kahn: "Slum Clearance Official's Bank Linked to Million $ Title I Deal." That was on June 16, 1959. Throughout that summer, there was one shocking revelation after another about Mr. Moses's stewardship of the Mayor's Committee on Slum Clearance, of which he was chairman. And as each new scandal bubbled out, it became clearer and clearer just what the ingredients were that held the Moses empire together. The glue was money, big money. There was a dash of organized crime; there was a banker who, as chief selector of slum clearance sponsors, filled the coffers of his bank with developers' funds (otherwise you didn't get to sponsor a project); there was Tammany Hall in the form of Carmine G. DeSapio and the former law partner of Bronx Democratic boss Ed Flynn, Monroe Goldwater; there was DeSapio's PR man (formerly Trujillo's flack) Sydney Baron, who was a useful man to have for PR because he could also help you get sponsorship of a project; and there were the construction unions and construction bosses, and even the Catholic Church. Everyone was mining gold in the slum clearance program.

Before 1959 was over, the then Mayor of New York City, Robert F. Wagner, Jr., knew he had to unload Moses so that he could run against his own record, and that of Moses, as a reformer in the 1960 mayoralty election. There was a great churning among the mighty in New York City: how to get rid of Moses? Instead of being indicted, Moses was to be given, in the words of Democratic State Senator Jerome L. Wilson, "the biggest old-age pension in history." That was the $100,000-a-year presidency of the New York World's Fair. Buried in the early minutes of the World's Fair Corporation Board of Directors was the evidence as to just how big and safe that pension was. After the Fair had faced near bankruptcy and most of its banker-led finance committee resigned in a huff because Moses had played fast and loose with them about money matters, it trickled out that Moses's salary had been put in escrow in the beginning and thus was his no matter what happened to the Fair. What's more, the $100,000 salary went on for a couple of years after the Fair closed and then was pared down to $25,000 a year. The escrow deal showed a vivid realism on the part of Mr. Moses about the Fair's prospects—doubtless justified, since he knew better than anyone the caliber of men he had with him to run the Fair. It was the same cast of characters that had made the slum clearance program a national scandal. One might fairly say that the World's Fair was the last chance at the trough for some of the grand old boodlers of New York City. For Moses himself, it meant close to $1 million, while many of the exhibitors he lured to the Fair were going bankrupt.

The press of New York showed remarkable resiliency. Once Moses was out of slum clearance and into the World's Fair, they wiped the record clean. There were a few small, snide voices like Douglas Haskell, then editor of *Architectural Forum*, who said, "They finally decided to sacrifice the World's Fair in order to save New York City." But by and large, the city-wide papers, their publishers in many cases investors in the Fair and recipients of splendid advertising supplements, lost the immense folders of clippings about the housing scandals in their morgues and never referred to them again. This was in aid of promoting the Fair, thought to be a civic and commercial event of paramount importance to the city's economy. In fact, the fiasco of

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the Fair cost the city a lot in both money and prestige.

If Moses was admired by the powerful, at least before the stench became too noticeable, he was anathema much earlier to the powerless. His slum clearance ventures proceeded with unbelievable ruthlessness. In one supposed development, Manhattantown, the developers milked the tenement poor for five years without putting up a structure—like any other slumlords, they collected full rents while letting the buildings deteriorate. The scandal finally forced a change in sponsorship. Other developments began to be fought desperately by tenants who no longer believed that relocation was good for them. Respectable civic organizations like the Women's City Club began to document that there was no way of even tracing the people relocated to make way for the projects. Areas like Hunts Point in the Bronx and East New York in Brooklyn are now disaster areas because of Robert Moses, who used them as dumping grounds for the poor he was throwing off future slum clearance sites. Sometimes, indeed, they were evicted two and three times. The Moses legacy to New York City even today is one of profound distrust between citizenry and their government.

The poor were not his only victims. On the south of Washington Square, Moses tore down a perfectly decent middle-income apartment house with family-size apartments. His Slum Clearance Committee lied to the South Village neighborhood when it told them that the new project, Washington Square Village, was to be for them. It was not. It became luxury housing, and the now cynical Italian-Americans in the neighborhood dubbed it "Tammany Towers."

If I write with some passion it is because my acquaintance with Mr. Moses had a profound effect on my own life. I was a political innocent in 1957, merely a park mother who used Washington Square. Then I found out that Robert Moses intended to put a four-lane depressed highway through that small square. I discovered that the threat to the park was not a new one but had, in fact, been going on since the 1930's. In the late 1930's, Moses's designs on that park were to turn it into a traffic rotary with the corners rounded off. Known as the "bathmat plan," it was defeated by architects and city planners and local citizenry. Moses waited and by the early 1950's he began to make noises about a roadway *through* the park. Another park mother, Mrs. Shirley Hayes, decided the only way to head Moses off was to close Washington Square Park to traffic, buses, etc. (There was then a single road through the park.) Everyone responsible thought she was a nut. But Mrs. Hayes fought on until she was joined by planners, architects, city planning critic Jane Jacobs, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Lewis Mumford, and hundreds of others.

It was Moses himself who finally damaged his own cause the most. Angrily responding to citizen protests against the Washington Square highway, Moses said, "The developers of the Washington Square South apartments were formally, officially, and reliably promised under the Slum Clearance Act a Fifth Avenue address and access for the large new population . . . ." The neighborhood became enraged at Moses's secret deal that would have sacrificed their park so that "slum" clearance developers could have a more profitable address. Like many others, I spent three years of my life in defeating that roadway. I joined political clubs. I joined city-wide civic organizations in order to get them to oppose the road. I began to write for the *Village Voice*. Every facet of Carmine DeSapio's obvious deal with Moses to get that roadway through was explored until finally DeSapio himself, to stave off defeat by the Village Independent Democrats, had to turn against the road.

Moses lost, and after the park was closed to traffic, and in spite of official denials that such a plan ever existed, a ramp was quietly dropped from the design for the Lower Manhattan Expressway at West Broadway, exactly where it would have joined with the projected Fifth Avenue South that Mr. Moses

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wanted to give the real estate developers. Moses's long-term grand design, it began to come out, was a great Fifth Avenue boulevard edged with luxury projects going right down into the heart of Lower Manhattan. The Lower Manhattan Expressway (also defeated) had a dual *raison d'etre*: it was both a slum clearance device and a way to pump more cars into the city. Mr. Moses's multiple roles as Parks Commissioner, slum clearer, and arterial highway coordinator all came together in his attack on Washington Square.

Mr. Moses does not dwell on his defeats in his book. He makes no reference to the Washington Square Park controversy at all. As for Washington Square Village, the only complaint he makes is that the press magnified the employment there of one Vincent Gigante, "a 31-year-old former boxer," who "was acquitted May 27, 1958, of the charge that he tried to murder Frank Costello, the gambler, the previous year . . . ." To Moses, this was dirty pool on the part of a *New York Times* reporter, Charles Grutzner. However, Grutzner was no ordinary *Times* reporter; he was and is the *Times* expert on the Mafia. Vincent "the Chin" Gigante was no ordinary one-time marksman; he was a full-time working hood who was later sent to prison with the *capo di capi* of the New York Mafia, Vito Genovese, for narcotics conspiracy. Moses chooses not to notice this history, just as he reacted furiously to the later revelations in 1959 that Thomas J. Shanahan, chief sponsor selector for Slum Clearance projects, knowingly picked another Mafia-connected fellow, Louis Pokrass, as a sponsor of a Harlem project after throwing out a perfectly respectable set of sponsors who had been willing to take it on. Shanahan, who was also Carmine DeSapio's bankroller, receives slight mention in Moses's book for a very good reason. It was his activities, sanctioned by Moses, which finally got Moses expelled from one of his most powerful city jobs, Chairman of the Slum Clearance Committee.

Moses preens quite a bit in *Public Works* over praise from the mighty. He quotes their letters ad nauseum. Like the one Nelson Rockefeller sent him after throwing him out as head of the State Parks Council. Moses was able to accept the bitter pill because, as he modestly puts it, "Cordial relations were restored with the Rockefellers, as evidenced, among other things, by the naming after me of the Niagara Power Station and Park, the principal state park on the St. Lawrence, the causeway to Fire Island, and the park on Fire Island, and by my association with the Governor's transportation program, with John D. Rockefeller III at Lincoln Center, and with David Rockefeller in the improvement of downtown New York." Elsewhere in the book, Moses lets us know that he was put on the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's pad for $25,000 a year as a "consultant," and later raised to $35,000. The Rockefellers know how to do these things nicely. One piece of Moses history I did not know is just how close Moses was to the Rockefellers on a number of projects outside New York City. He was consultant to the Rockefellers' South American corporation, IBEC, in Brazil and Caracas, as well as to Laurance Rockefeller's Dorado Beach development. Moses used to spread the myth that he had little interest in money and that his only public salary was his $25,000 as Parks Commissioner of New York, but he did a hefty bit of consulting. He did his bit to muck up Portland, Oregon, the Vieux Carré in New Orleans, Baltimore, and other cities with his single-minded concentration on one form of transport, the automobile.

There is not a trace of regret for any of this. His only mention of air pollution is in connection with an attack on Mayor John Lindsay for not building the Lower Manhattan Expressway. He says indignantly that "the city even issued statements to the effect that any elevated expressway would poison the air in the entire neighborhood and threaten the lives of passersby and residents." Moses never addresses himself to whether those statements were accurate,

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for the environmental effects of what he wrought in highways is beyond his ken. He is a little more interested in water pollution. And for a very good reason—sewage treatment plants require millions of dollars for construction.

So the good things one can say about Moses are that he was against water pollution and one other interesting abomination. He was vehemently opposed to the construction of underground fall-out shelters. It is never very clear why, unless he was sure he was not destined to head up the program or he feared that a shelter program would divert funds from highway building. But he describes a conference at Arden House, sponsored by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 1957. Who should be its chairman but President Nixon's present Dr. Strangelove, Henry A. Kissinger. The purpose of the conference, says Moses, was to push the shelter program which had just received a big spread in *Life*. Moses says he and an aide, George Spargo, poured cold water on the idea of spending $24 billion to burrow underground. He attacks the late Henry Luce for his motives in advocating shelters, noting that the only explanation for it is that it "was a cold-blooded circus sensation to boost circulation." That is the conclusion Moses says he arrived at "in retrospect." But I wonder. Moses was very mad at the Luce publications for not boosting the World's Fair enough; he attacked them for ingratitude since they had the contract to publish the official Fair guide. "In retrospect" I would guess this was more likely to be the source of Moses's animus toward Luce.

The real story of Robert Moses will have to wait until the long-researched, unauthorized (so unauthorized that Moses tried to get the publisher to kill it) biography by Robert Caro, a former *Newsday* reporter, comes out. This volume, to be published by Simon and Schuster under the title *The Power Broker: The Story of Robert Moses*, will come out this fall. It chronicles, I am given to understand, his early days as an idealistic reformer and shows at what point in Moses's life he began to turn cynical.

Moses as a young idealist somehow escapes me, since I have only experienced him in later life. He has pretty well etched out any such softheadedness from his book. The Moses I will remember is the Moses I saw on a telecast in 1963 as he was struggling with the problems of opening the World's Fair. He was having trouble getting many countries to participate. But there was one country and leader he really admired. "They [the Spanish] have leadership and discipline there—I don't care if you like the government or not." And of the Caudillo himself, Moses said, with a trace of wistfulness, "When he says something, that's it." For those who get that far in Mr. Moses's book, there is a fine photograph of Moses and the Caudillo on page 552. Not one to be made self-conscious by a rising storm of criticism, Moses had rushed over to Spain to pin a medal on Franco just at the moment the World's Fair came to be recognized as a disaster. But that's not in the book—some cautious editor undoubtedly ruled out any explanation of what Moses was doing with Franco on that occasion. ■

The Political Puzzle

Answers to the June puzzle:

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